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The Future of Cybertravel:
Legal Im plications of the Evasion of
Geolocation
Marketa Trimble*
Although the Internet is valued by many of its supporters
particularly because it both defies and defeats physical borders,
these important attributes are now being exposed to attempts by
both governments and private entities to impose territorial limits
through blocking or permitting access to content by Internet users
based on their geographical location—a territorial partitioning of
the Internet. One of these attempts is the recent Stop Online
Piracy Act (―SOPA‖) proposal in the United States. This article,
as opposed to earlier literature on the topic discussing the possible
virtues and methods of erecting borders in cyberspace, focuses on
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an Internet activity that is designed to bypass the territorial
partitioning of cyberspace and render any partitioning attempts
ineffective.
The activity—cybertravel, or the evasion of
geolocation—permits users to access content on the Internet that is
normally not available when they connect to the Internet from their
geographical location. By utilizing an Internet protocol address
that does not correspond to their physical location, but to a
location from which access to the content is permitted, users can
view or use content that is otherwise unavailable to them.
Although cybertravel is not novel (some cybertravel tools have
been available for a number of years), recently the tools allowing
it have proliferated and become sufficiently user-friendly to allow
even average Internet users to utilize them. Indeed, there is an
increasing interest in cybertravel among the general Internet
public as more and more website operators employ geolocation
tools to limit access to content on their websites from certain
countries or regions.
This article analyzes the current legal status of cybertravel and
explores how the law may treat cybertravel in the future. The
analysis of the current legal framework covers copyright as well as
other legal doctrines and the laws of multiple countries, with a
special emphasis on U.S. law. The future of the legal status of
cybertravel will be strongly affected by the desire of countries and
many Internet actors to erect borders on the Internet to facilitate
compliance with territorially-defined regulation and enjoy the
advantages of a territorially-partitioned cyberspace. This article
makes an attempt to identify arguments for making or keeping
certain types of cybertravel legal, and suggests legal,
technological, and business solutions for any cybertravel that may
be permitted.
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 569
I. THE INTERNET AS A BORDERLESS MEDIUM ................. 575
II. GEOLOCATION TOOLS .................................................. 586
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INTRODUCTION
An important decision awaits countries and the international
community at large: whether people should be free to break the
territorial limits that governments and other entities attempt to
impose on the Internet—whether Internet users should have the
freedom to travel in cyberspace. Traveling in cyberspace, or
―cybertravel,‖ allows Internet users to view the Internet as if they
were in a location other than where they are physically present.
Users cybertravel by altering the information that identifies the
geographical location from which they are accessing the Internet
on the device they use to connect to the Internet. Once they alter
the information, they appear to the Internet world to be physically
located in a different location. Through cybertravel, Internet users
are able to view or use content on the Internet that they would
otherwise not be permitted to access because of geolocation tools
that block access to content based on the geographical location of a
user.
While cybertravel is a network capability that many users
appreciate, it frustrates the efforts of those who want geographical
borders to be created and maintained on the Internet so that
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Internet actors1 can comply with territorially-defined regulations or
contractual obligations and enjoy certain advantages that result
from a territorially-partitioned cyberspace—for example, the
possibility of price differentiation in different markets or localized
advertising. Whether cybertravel should or should not be legal is
not a matter of abstract academic debate; it is an important
question that has already appeared on legislative agendas. 2 This
article presents cybertravel and its forms, explains the various uses
of cybertravel, and assesses its legality. It discusses whether there
is a place for legal cybertravel on the Internet, and if there is a
place, what legal, technological, and business solutions may
facilitate that cybertravel.
Current developments make the
discussion of the legality of cybertravel particularly timely;
because cybertravel could subvert these developments, it is
important at this point to clarify what its status should be.
There is evidence of an increasing interest in the territorial
partitioning of the Internet. Despite the various projections for the
future of the Internet that predicted a specific type of regulation
that would apply to and on a ―borderless medium,‖3 governments
want to have the territorial scope of regulation and enforcement on
the Internet mirror the territorial limits of the physical world.4 This
governmental interest in borders on the Internet is shared by
private parties; while governments seek ways to protect their

1

The term ―Internet actors‖ is used not only to describe Internet users but also to
describe anyone who acts on the Internet: website operators, Internet service providers,
etc. For an explanation of the terms ―website operator‖ and ―Internet service provider‖ as
used in this article see infra notes 6 and 61 and the accompanying text.
2
See Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong., § 102(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2011).
3
See infra Part I. A difference may be drawn between the regulation of the medium
(regulation of the Internet—e.g., who should be in charge of assigning addresses on the
Internet) and the regulation of activities that occur on the medium (regulation on the
Internet—e.g., consumer protection laws, tax laws, defamation laws that apply to conduct
on the Internet). This article concerns any national regulation that is limited to a certain
territory; such national regulation includes both types of regulation—regulation of the
Internet (e.g., rules for Internet service providers) and regulation on the Internet (all
national laws that may pertain to conduct on the Internet).
4
See Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 785 (2001).
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citizens from the influx of certain content,5 website operators6
search for workable solutions to partition cyberspace in order to
both secure compliance with territorially-limited regulation and
enforcement and take advantage of the partitioned cybermarket.
To achieve the partitioning, entities on the Internet employ
geolocation tools to localize Internet users and control the content
that is available to the users based on their location. Increasingly,
geolocation is not only a matter of voluntary adoption by Internet
actors but also a matter of decree: governments and courts are
beginning to mandate the use of geolocation tools as a valid means
of achieving compliance with the laws of particular jurisdictions.7
It is likely that as geolocation use increases to limit access to
certain content8 it will generate more interest in cybertravel,9
which will become widespread, undermine geolocation efforts, and

5

See, e.g., infra note 56 (seizures of domain names in the United States); see also
Country Profiles, OPENNET INITIATIVE, http://opennet.net/country-profiles (last visited
Mar. 7, 2012) (numerous examples of countries ordering Internet service providers to
block certain websites). For the term ―Internet service provider‖ as used in this article
see infra note 61 and the accompanying text.
6
The term ―website operator‖ describes any entity that runs its own website. This
term is to be distinguished from ―Internet service provider.‖ See infra note 61 and
accompanying text.
7
See infra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
8
The 2010 Internet-Draft of the Geographic Location/Privacy (geopriv) group of the
Internet Engineering Task Force has noted that ―[a]s the accuracy of location information
improves and the expense of calculating and obtaining it declines, the distribution and use
of location information in Internet-based services will likely become increasingly
pervasive.‖ Barnes et al., An Architecture for Location and Location Privacy in Internet
Applications: Internet-Draft, GEOPRIV4 (Oct. 11, 2010), http://tools.ietf.org/pdf/draft-ietfgeopriv-arch-03.pdf; see also A. Mayrhofer & C. Spanring, A Uniform Resource
Identifier for Geographic Locations (‗geo‘ URI), INTERNET ENG‘G TASK FORCE 4, (June
2010), http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc5870.txt.pdf (―Most web search engines
use geographic information, and a vivid open source mapping community has brought an
enormous momentum into location aware technology.‖).
9
See Benjamin Edelman, Shortcomings and Challenges in the Restriction of Internet
Retransmissions of Over-the-Air Television Content to Canadian Internet Users 9 (2001),
available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/archived_ content/people/edelman/pubs/jump091701.pdf (expert memorandum attached to the National Association of Broadcasters‘
submission to Industry Canada) (―The availability of exclusive high-value content
protected by geographic analysis systems would be likely to encourage additional efforts
at circumvention via proxy servers.‖).
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make territorially-limited regulation and enforcement on the
Internet even more difficult.
The seminal question for regulating the use of cybertravel is
whether it should be allowed at all, considering its potential to
severely undermine the current trajectory of regulation and
enforcement on the Internet. The most straightforward manner of
addressing the potentially subversive effect of cybertravel is to
make it illegal. Absent cybertravel, geolocation tools would face
minimal or negligible obstacles and national regulation and
enforcement on the Internet could emulate that of the physical
world.
This article supports the survival of cybertravel with specific
limitations. It argues that cybertravel should be equated to
physical travel, and advocates that the legality of cybertravel
should be protected for the same reasons for which we value the
freedom of physical travel. The importance of physical travel,
including international travel, which in the United States is
underscored by constitutional protections,10 emanates from its
benefits to society, not the least of which is the access to
information about alternative views and practices.11 People who
travel learn about views held by others and various solutions to
social problems, regulation, and enforcement. Travel can inspire,
teach, and facilitate an understanding of other societies, and assist
in securing a peaceful co-existence of nations.12 In the near future,
cybertravel will play a role very similar to that of physical travel as
cyberspace becomes as partitioned as the physical world. Even if
this partitioning is the result of the imposition of reasonable
jurisdictional limits on the Internet, it is questionable whether the
resulting borders should be less permeable than the borders of the
physical world.

10

Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); see infra Part IV.B.3.
Id. at 125–27 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (University of Kansas Press 1956)). On the right to
access to information, see infra Part IV.B.3.
12
Id. at 127 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (University of Kansas Press 1956)).
11
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This article analyzes cybertravel and its current status, and
projects its future.
Part I discusses the notion of the
―borderlessness‖ of the Internet, its origins, development, and
current state. Part II discusses one of the methods used today to
defeat Internet borderlessness and allow the erection of borders;
the method—arguably the preferred of the existing methods of the
territorial partitioning of the Internet13—relies on geolocation tools
to partition cyberspace. Part II explains how geolocation tools
work, who uses them and for what purposes. Part III focuses on
the use of cybertravel as the evasion of geolocation. It reviews the
various methods of cybertravel and provides examples of its uses.
Part IV analyzes the legality of cybertravel as it exists today and
proposes approaches that the law could take to cybertravel in the
future; it also discusses possible technological and business
solutions that may make cybertravel possible notwithstanding the
developments that appear to preordain cybertravel‘s illegality.
It should be noted that two topics are peripheral to the primary
focus of this article.14 Although the article touches upon the two
topics—anonymization and place-shifting services—they are not
its primary focus. Although it may appear that the problem of
achieving anonymity on the Internet (or anonymous Internet
browsing) is related to the legal issues of cybertravel,
anonymization is in fact neither a prerequisite for nor a
consequence of the legalization of cybertravel. The relationship
between the two phenomena is analyzed in Part IV,15 but this
article provides no answers to questions about anonymization.
Place-shifting services, which either retransmit television programs
13
Another method of erecting borders on the Internet is the filtering imposed by
Internet service providers. Internet service provider filtering prevents users from
accessing content that has been blocked by the provider. The most controversial method
consists of installing a filter on users‘ hardware. See infra Part I (discussing methods of
erecting borders on the Internet). For the definition of ―Internet service provider‖ as used
in this article, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
14
In attempting to cover a broad scope of various legal issues that pertain to
cybertravel, this article inevitably generalizes and omits in-depth analyses of some issues
deserving separate detailed inquiries (e.g., issues of personal jurisdiction and the legal
status of cache copies). Such inquiries are beyond the scope of this article.
15
On the relationship (or the absence thereof) of anonymization and cybertravel see
infra Part IV.B.2.
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themselves (e.g., ivi in the United States,16 TV CatchUP in the
United Kingdom,17 shiftTV in Germany,18 and ManekiTV in
Japan),19 or enable users to share retransmission of television
programs (e.g., Justin.tv20 and WorldTV),21 resemble cybertravel
because they also secure access to content in places where the
content is normally not available.22 Although recent legal disputes
concerning these services23 may be the precursors to legal
challenges to cybertravel, legal issues that concern place-shifting
services do not coincide with but only overlap with the issues
associated with cybertravel.24
16

http://www.ivi.tv/faq (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
TVCATCHUP, http://www.tvcatchup.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
18
SHIFTTV, http://www.shift.tv (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
19
MANEKITV, http://www.manekitv.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
20
JUSTIN.TV, http://www.justin.tv (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). According to its CEO,
Michael Seibel, Justin.tv ―provide[s] a platform that empowers people to create and share
live video online. Our site is the modern equivalent of the town square, but instead of
standing on a soap box to be heard a user can broadcast his or her message to the world.‖
Piracy of Live Sports Broadcasting over the Internet: Hearing before the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 25 (2009) (Statement of Michael Seibel, CEO, Justin.tv, Inc.).
21
WORLDTV, http://worldtv.com/pages (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
22
For a reference to Slingbox, another non-cybertravel service that offers access to
territorially-limited content, see infra note 259.
23
See, e.g., WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Toshiko
Aritake, Top Court Says Retransmission of Network TV Content Violates Copyrights, 25
WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 16 (Jan. 25, 2011); ITV Broad. Ltd. v. TV CatchUp
Ltd., [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3063; ITV Broad. Ltd. v. TV CatchUp Ltd., [2011] EWHC
(Pat) 1874; and ITV Broad. Ltd. v. TV CatchUp Ltd., [2011] EWHC (Pat) 2977;
Bundesgerichtshof, [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Apr. 22, 2009, MEDIEN, INTERNET
UND RECHT [MIR] 173, 2009 (Ger.) (Shift.tv). The Ultimate Fighting Championship filed
a lawsuit against Justin.tv on January 21, 2011. Complaint, Zuffa, LLC v. Justin.tv, Inc.,
No. 2:11-cv-00114-RLH-LRL (D. Nev. filed Jan. 21, 2011). See also Piracy of Live
Sports Broadcasting over the Internet: Hearing before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 25 (2009) (statement of Michael Seibel, CEO, Justin.tv, Inc.); see also infra Part
IV.A.2.
24
First, because of the manner in which the technology involved in cybertravel
functions, as opposed to the manner in which place-shifting tools that are mentioned here
function, cybertravel might not be viewed as a retransmission of content to a new (not
originally intended) audience. Second, even if the differences in technology are
considered irrelevant to an inquiry about the existence of liability for copyright
infringement, not all legal issues relevant to cases of cybertravel would apply to placeshifting services. Although users do cybertravel to watch video content not available in
their country or region, this is not the only purpose for which they cybertravel, and
therefore limiting the present inquiry to this one aspect of cybertravel would most
17

IVI,
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I. THE INTERNET AS A BORDERLESS MEDIUM25
At its birth, the Internet was endowed with an architecture that
sounded very appealing: the medium would be designed so that no
one authority could assert complete control over it.26 This design
idea shaped the creation of the Arpanet, the predecessor of the
Internet,27 as a decentralized network that would become the basis
of the structure of the Internet. This deliberate design led to a
network that not only defied central control but also lacked borders
for partitioning control territorially; one of the network‘s defining
features was the absence of any borders. Dan Jerker B.
Svantesson, who has worked on the legal problems associated with
the Internet‘s borderlessness and issues of geolocation for a
number of years,28 calls borderlessness ―one of [the Internet‘s]

certainly not exhaust all the legal issues associated with cybertravel, and the limitation
would render the legal analysis of cybertravel incomplete. See infra Part IV.A.2 for the
discussion of various legal aspects concerning cybertravel. For the legal issues of the
streaming of content on the Internet, see Maurizio Borghi, Chasing Copyright
Infringement in the Streaming Landscape, 42 INT‘L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMP. LAW
316 (2011).
25
The word ―Internet‖ technically refers to only one of the network protocols;
however, given the prevailing use of the protocol and the fact that it has been equated to
the network itself, this paper talks only about the Internet. On the two current versions of
the protocol see infra Part II.B.
26
See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A
BORDERLESS WORLD 23 (Oxford University Press 2006) (―[T]he founders embraced a
design that distrusted centralized control. In effect, they built strains of American
libertarianism, and even 1960s idealism, into the universal language of the Internet.‖);
INSTRUCTIONAL DESIGN: SYSTEM, STRATEGIES 167 (Bruce R. Ledford, Phillip J. Sleeman,
eds.) (―Primarily because of the needs inherent in the cold war, it became obvious to the
Military and Department of Defense that the ability to wage modern warfare had to be
decentralized.‖); see also Paul Baran, On Distributed Communications: I. Introduction to
Distributed
Communications
Networks,
RAND
CORP.
(Aug.
1964),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_memoranda/2006/RM3420.pdf.
27
See generally JANET ABBATE, INVENTING THE INTERNET (MIT Press 2000)
(discussing the creation and early days of the Internet); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra
note 26, at 22–23.
28
Svantesson has written about geolocation since 2003. Dan Jerker B. Svantesson,
How Does the Accuracy of Geo-Location Technologies Affect the Law, 2 MASARYK U. J.
L. & T. 11, 20 (2008), available at http://mujlt.law.muni.cz/storage/1234798550
_sb_02_svantesson.pdf [hereinafter Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location]. A
number of Svantesson‘s papers related to geolocation are available on his website.
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greatest attributes.‖29 This Part discusses this feature of the
Internet, its origins, its impact on the Internet and regulation of the
Internet, and its current state and future.
Robert Taylor, a former Director of the Information Processing
Techniques Office of the Advanced Research Project Agency, the
agency that developed the Arpanet in the late 1960s, attributed the
idea for the particular architecture of the Arpanet (that led to the
borderlessness of the Internet) to Wesley Clark, an electrical
engineer who worked for Washington University in St. Louis
during that time. Taylor recalled that the decision to support
Clark‘s idea was related to Taylor‘s own skepticism of central
authority; his experience from the Vietnam War convinced him
that any central authority should not be trusted, so he agreed with a
plan to establish the network with no central control.30 In fact,
however, the Department of Defense also had its own reasons for
being interested in a decentralized architecture; such an
architecture was more likely to withstand an enemy attack.31
Therefore, the distributed architecture of the network was not a
matter of coincidence,32 nor was it dictated by technical necessity;
SVANTESSON.ORG, http://www.svantesson.org/projects/geo-identification/articles--papersrelating-to-geo-identification.aspx (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
29
Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, ―Imagine There‘s No Countries…‖—Geo-Identification,
the Law, and the Not-So-Borderless Internet, 10 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1, 20 (2007).
30
Computer History Museum, Net @ 40: Robert W. Taylor in Conversation with
National Public Radio‘s Guy Raz, YOUTUBE (May 13, 2010), http://www.youtube.
com/computerhistory#p/search/0/Y0MsrrTo8jY (―Other people who were thinking about
the networking architecture as we would design it were imagining central locations for a
single computer in the middle of the country that would control the network all over the
country. What a stupid idea! I knew it was a stupid idea but I did not have a better one.
Wes[ley] Clark had a better one.‖). For Taylor‘s recollections of his experience from the
Vietnam War era, see id.; see also John Markoff, Control the Internet? A Futile Pursuit,
Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2005, at C4, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2005/11/14/business/14register.html?_r=2 (discussing Taylor‘s recollections); see also
Jonathan Zittrain, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 28–35 (2008)
(explaining the beginnings of the Internet in general).
31
Baran, supra note 26.
32
Cf. DAVID G. POST, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON‘S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF
CYBERSPACE 103 (2009) (―Perhaps it was a coincidence that the network that became ‗the
Internet‘ was the one that operated this way: end-to-end, innovations coming from the
edges via this strange kind of creeping consensus among users, no centralized control. I
doubt it, though.‖).
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the particular architecture had significant political and strategic
motivations.33
The technical design of the Internet has a critical impact on the
power of governments to impose regulation and enforcement in the
space.34 To regulate a territory, a government needs to exert its
enforcement power in the territory, or have other governments
wield this power on its behalf. The willingness—or lack thereof—
of foreign governments to lend their support to enforcing one
government‘s regulations defines the limits of the power of that
government to regulate. The problem in a borderless world is that
if a government has the physical ability to enforce its will, for
instance, because Internet servers are located in its territory, 35 it
ultimately regulates and enforces worldwide; other governments
cannot push back,36 and the regulating and enforcing power of the
one country thus extends to the world‘s entire cyberspace.37 On
the other hand, if a government cannot enforce its regulations
because particular servers, server providers, website operators or
their assets are located outside of that government‘s enforcement

33

Computer History Museum, supra note 30, at 1:17:25 (noting that the fact that ―the
Arpanet was deliberately heavily decentralized . . . came from political motivations as
well as technical motivations.‖).
34
Id. at 1:12:21 (Taylor claims that the creators of the Arpanet realized that its
borderlessness would not be limited to the United States but would extend globally. He
recalls that it did not appear that ―anyone who worked on [the Arpanet] in those days
thought it would be limited to the United States.‖).
35
The physical presence of the website operator or its assets does not have to be in the
country of enforcement; servers may be targets of enforcement actions instead. Cf. Jack
L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1217 (1998) (―A
defendant‘s physical presence or assets within the territory remains the primary basis for
a nation or state to enforce its laws.‖).
36
Governments may try to build walls on the Internet that will keep certain content out
of their territory; however, filtering is associated with a number of problems. The U.S.
government is using its enforcement power over ―related actors‖ (Internet service
providers, payment processors, etc.) to enforce its laws, but U.S. legislative initiatives
that target such related actors are not without controversy. See infra notes 59–65 and
accompanying text.
37
Anupam Chander, Trade 2.0, 34 YALE J. INT‘l L. 281, 285 (2009) (―Left
unattended, footloose net-work might imperil domestic laws, replacing local law with the
regulation, if any, of the net-work provider‘s home state . . . [T]he importing of services
should not require us to import law as well.‖).
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power, that government‘s regulatory power is nonexistent38 unless
the government manages to exert its power over Internet users
residing in its territory or other actors located in its territory. Such
actors may include service providers and payment processors, or
anyone that facilitates the operations of the website operators.39
When the Internet became a mass medium, the initial desire to
have no central authority controlling the network was replaced by a
realization that non-regulation in cyberspace might create more
problems than the socially valuable opportunities that this
architecture might offer. Some questioned whether the Internet
was susceptible to any regulation at all. It is not surprising that the
disadvantages of non-regulation on the Internet were identified by
someone who personally observed the regulatory disarray in the
post-communist countries. Lawrence Lessig, who was engaged as
an advisor to these countries,40 suggested a need for governance on
the Internet and posited that the regulation should be based on the
―code‖—the architecture of the Internet, the technical design that
de facto regulates behavior on the Internet.41 The architecture
would dictate to a large degree what the law could do, and be the
―code,‖ not only in the technical sense, but to a certain degree also
in the legal sense.42 If governments wished to regulate the Internet
38

See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 789–90 (describing a potential hurdle to
interstate enforcement within the United States associated with the lack of physical
borders on the Internet and therefore with the danger of territorially-unlimited
prescriptive jurisdiction).
39
Targeting ―related actors‖—actors that are linked to providers of certain content—
can raise concerns that are similar to those that are raised by filtering. See infra note 59
(describing the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act in the United States, which would target
such related actors).
40
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE, AND OTHER LAWS oF CYBERSPACE 3 (Basic Books 1999).
41
See Michael Geist, Cyberlaw 2.0, 44 B.C. L. REV. 323, 357 (2003) (―[T]he three
principles of Cyberlaw 1.0 . . . are in fact tied together by one larger principle—that
government would not, could not, and should not apply its traditional regulatory
mechanisms to the Internet.‖).
42
WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, CITY OF BITS: SPACE, PLACE AND THE INFOBAHN 111 (1996)
(discussing the famous ―code is the law‖); Christoph B. Graber, Internet Creativity,
Communicative Freedom and a Constitutional Rights Theory Response to ―Code is
Law‖, at 5 (The Research Centre for International Communications and Art Law at the
University of Lucerne, Working Paper No. 2010/03), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1737630 (correctly pointing out that Lessig ―does not equalise
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they would have to utilize its architecture—its ―code‖ in the
technical sense; at the same time, the architecture would protect
the Internet from government imposition of laws inconsistent with
the structure of the network.43 The solution to the problem of
regulation on the Internet would have to be predicated on its
architecture.
If conduct on the Internet should and could be regulated, the
question then was who should regulate it. One school of thought
declared that no one should regulate conduct on the Internet,44
although the ―no one‖ did not really mean a complete absence of
regulation. Because the technical ―code‖ is a significant regulatory
tool, it is clear that the ―no one‖ would be the Internet designers,
who continue to shape the Internet and its de facto technical
regulatory framework.45 Although Internet designers would
always have an important role to play in the Internet‘s future,
including the Internet‘s susceptibility to certain types of regulation,
there seems to be no legitimate reason that they should dictate the
full scope of the ―code‖ in the legal sense.46 Despite their
―parental claims,‖ Internet designers would not be the proper
‗law‘ and ‗code;‘‖ rather, he ―defines ‗code‘ as a form of co-action between software and
hardware on the Internet constituting an architecture of technology,‖ which ―is a
structure that conditions regulation on the Internet.‖).
43
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 3 (Basic Books 2006) (―The claim for
cyberspace was not just that governments would not regulate cyberspace—it was that
government could not regulate cyberspace.‖).
44
John Perry Barlow, Declaration of Cyberspace Independence, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Davos, Switzerland 1996), available at https://projects.eff.org/ ~barlow/
Declaration-Final.html.
45
Graber, supra note 42, at 5 (―[T]he actor who reigns over the architecture of
technology also defines the rights and constraints existing within this architecture.‖).
46
LESSIG, supra note 40, at 8 (There were advocates of an expert-centered approach:
―We are at a stage in our history when we urgently need to make fundamental choices
about values, but we should trust no institution of government to make such choices.‖);
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 30 (―Internet‘s founding vision [was] of an open,
noncommercial network run by selfless experts for the benefit of all.‖). Of course, given
many people‘s disillusions with the choices of democratic governments perhaps it would
be better to entrust regulation to independent experts; however, such an approach to
shaping the ―code‖ should have a democratic oversight unless we want to abandon
democracy altogether. See also Graber, supra note 42, at 6 (discussing the need to subject
to constitutional scrutiny not only governmental but also private actions manipulating
Internet infrastructure).

580

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:567

authority to make all the regulatory choices for life in
cyberspace.47
Those who have agreed on the need to regulate in cyberspace
have been divided between those who have predicted a special new
type of regulation for the Internet,48 and those who have rejected
any specificity for the medium and have insisted that the Internet
be subject to the same regulations that apply to conduct occurring
in other means of communication. The first group, the Internet
exceptionalists, call for new bodies to be established to govern
cyberspace.49 The second group, the Internet non-exceptionalists,
have seen no reason to discuss who should govern cyberspace
because in their view the Internet should be subject to existing
regulation.50
With the increasing population of cyberspace and a growing
spectrum of activities taking place on the Internet, the world did
not wait for a resolution of the debate among the Internet
designers, the exceptionalists, and the non-exceptionalists. As
Michael Geist observed in 2003, the innocent age of the Internet
47

In fact, the ―code‖ in the technical sense cannot serve as the only regulatory
framework in cyberspace; there are limitations of the ―code‖ in the technical sense and a
need for it to be supported by other forms of regulation. See Barnes et al., supra note 8, at
6–7.
48
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 25 (The options include ―the internationalists‘
view‖ that ―territorial rule would need to be supplemented, and eventually replaced, by
global governmental institutions.‖). Another option is for the Internet community to
govern itself independently of national governments. See POST, supra note 32, at 185
(―[I]t‘s all just people in one place interacting and communicating with other people in
other places. So why not begin by recognizing their right–perhaps even their inalienable
right?–to govern themselves as they see fit?‖).
49
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders–The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1367 (1996) (―This . . . distinct Cyberspace . . .
needs and can create its own law and legal institutions.‖).
50
See Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 827 (―The error is the belief that the
Internet is a unique phenomenon that requires suspension of the normal principles that
govern cross-border conduct.‖); Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1250 (―Cyberspace
transactions are no different from ‗real-space‘ transnational transactions. . . . There is no
general normative argument that supports the immunization of cyberspace activities from
territorial regulation. . . . Resolution of the choice-of-law problems presented by
cyberspace transactions will be challenging, but no more challenging than similar
problems raised in other transnational contexts.‖); see also POST, supra note 32, at 166–
67 (discussing exceptionalists‘ versus non-exceptionalists‘ views).
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was replaced by the rule of ―cyberlaw 2.0,‖ which confirmed the
views and predictions of the non-exceptionalists, and ―[brought]
with it a shift from a borderless network to borderless law, from
code that regulates to code that is regulated, and from selfregulation to government regulation.‖51 History proved that the
borderless network would not have to mean the end of
governmental control or the end of regulation and enforcement, but
that it would be transformed into a borderless regulation supported
by unilateral and yet globally-reaching enforcement.52
Once governments began to engage in de facto global
enforcement on the Internet, the borderlessness of the network no
longer appeared to be an advantage, and the desirability of borders
began to be re-evaluated. This development can be perceived as a
logical result of the maturing of both the Internet and some of its
advocates; or, a much less encouraging explanation suggests that
the interest in raising borders on the Internet was one of the signs
of the inevitable ―Cycle‖ that Tim Wu has described in various
industries and great inventions53—the ―Cycle‖ that turns amazing,
groundbreaking inventions into the tools of vicious monopolies.54
And, counter-intuitively, raising borders may in fact assist such
monopolies in asserting their power globally: while without
51

Geist, supra note 41, at 358.
Id. at 335–47 (Geist listed examples of ―aggressive extra-territorial legislative
approach‖ in the areas of copyright, domain names regulation, privacy, computer crime,
and online gambling.); see also Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding
Significance of Territorial Sovereignty, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 483 (1998)
(an earlier piece by Jack Goldsmith predicting cyberlaw 2.0).
53
TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 6
(2010) (―Without exception, the brave new technologies of the twentieth century–free use
of which was originally encouraged, for the sake of further invention and individual
expression–eventually evolved into privately controlled industrial behemoths, the ‗old
media‘ giants of the twenty-first, through which the flow and nature of content would be
strictly controlled for reasons of commerce.‖).
54
Id. at 7 (―If the Internet, whose present openness has become a way of life, should
prove as much subject to the Cycle as every other information network before it, the
practical consequences will be staggering.‖); see also GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26,
at 10 (―By 2005 Yahoo had come full circle. The darling of the Internet free speech
movement had become an agent of thought control for the Chinese government. . . . The
Yahoo story encapsulates the Internet‘s transformation from a technology that resists
territorial law to one that facilitates its enforcement.‖).
52
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borders those who hold monopolies in only some countries face
competition on the Internet from foreign competitors, with borders
the monopoly holders may fully occupy the space.
Although it may seem at first that raising Internet borders is
inherently undesirable, the fact is that raising borders may be as
liberating as it is limiting.55 The geographically unlimited
regulation and enforcement of cyberlaw 2.0 has been liberating
only when it is ―our‖ laws that are being enforced; as soon as other
countries enforce ―their‖ laws that are contrary to our beliefs, we
begin to look for ways to protect our own value system.56 We
might not always agree with our government‘s actions, but at least
we have the option of influencing them. Having foreign
governments imposing regulations on us that we cannot affect
makes us reconsider the value of borders,57 and contemplate
ending the borderlessness of the Internet.58
55

Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 4, at 796–97 (discussing benefits of territoriallylimited or geographically-defined regulations).
56
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 152 (―A bordered Internet is valuable precisely
because it permits people of different value systems to coexist on the same planet.‖). See,
e.g., Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L‘Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev‘d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006); Sarl Louis Feraud
Int‘l. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007). But cf. Government Domain Name
Siezures Violate First Amendment, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (June 21, 2011),
https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2011/06/20 (describing reactions to the seizures of
domain names by the U.S. government in response to allegations of providing access to
counterfeited or copyright-infringing content). According to a BNA report, between
2009 and February 2011 ―[t]he government has seized nearly 100 domains.‖ John
Herzfeld, Domains Seized by Authorities for Publishing Hyperlinks to Unauthorized
Streaming Video, BNA, Feb. 9, 2011; see also Federal Courts Order Seizure of 150
Website Domains Involved in Selling Counterfeit Goods as Part of DOJ, ICE HSI and
FBI Cyber Monday Crackdown, U.S. DEP‘T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/November/11-ag-1540.html (describing seizures of
domain names).
57
―[C]ontrary to what many expect, the geographically bordered Internet has many
underappreciated virtues. . . . The bordered Internet accommodates real and important
differences among peoples in different places, and makes the Internet a more effective
and useful communication tool as a result.‖ GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at viii.
58
It also transpired that businesses did not respond to cyberlaw 2.0 by moving their
seats, servers and assets to jurisdictions with limited regulation and enforcement. The
absence of the feared ―race to the bottom‖ may be explained by the global nature of large
businesses for which operating against local regulations is extremely disadvantageous;
they may have assets in multiple countries, which they need to protect from potential
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There are three methods of imposing borders on the Internet:
the first two methods rely on content filtering and the third relies
on the actions of website operators.59 Content filters can be
installed directly on a user‘s hardware or applied at the level of
Internet service providers60—those who connect users to the
Internet, such as cable companies, telephone companies, and
wireless service providers.61 The first filtering method—hardware
content filtering—is highly controversial; the second method—
service provider content filtering—is applied not only by
oppressive regimes but also by democratic countries, 62 and
certainly has merit when used to enforce decisions by courts or
administrative agencies.63 However, unless it is based on a
enforcement actions, or they do not want to lose existing markets as a result of their own
non-compliance, or they want to preserve their option to enter into prospective markets in
the future. Additionally, many smaller businesses do not have the resources to relocate
their operations to avoid regulation; therefore, no exodus to minimum-regulation
jurisdictions occurred. Instead, many actors on the Internet strive to comply with local
regulation and employ geolocation tools to achieve that goal.
59
Not all enforcement of laws on the Internet relies on the territorial partitioning of the
Internet. See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 102(c)(2)(C) (2011)
(proposing to bar online payment providers from doing business with websites that
breach the law). Such proposals raise a number of issues, including their potential
extraterritorial effects.
60
See infra notes 320–22 and accompanying text (on filtering by service providers);
see also FREEDOM ON THE NET: A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA
6–7 (Sanja Kelly & Sarah Cook eds., Freedom House, 2011).
61
The term ―Internet service provider‖ as used here does not match the statutorily
defined term ―service provider.‖ See 17 U.S.C. § 512(k)(1) (2010) (defining ―service
provider‖ to cover a wider range of entities).
62
See Jonathan Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Documentation of Internet Filtering
Worldwide, BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC‘Y-HARV. L. SCH., http://cyber.law.
harvard.edu/filtering/ (last updated Oct. 24, 2003).
63
For instance, a court may order Internet service providers to block access to a
website that does not comply with a court‘s decision according to local regulations
against pornography. It is more problematic if a government requests that service
providers filter for pornography and block the content without any formal proceedings to
establish the illegality of the particular content. See also Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corp. v. British Telecomms. PLC, [2011] EWHC (Ch) 2714 (Eng.) (for a decision in the
context of copyright infringement); Directive 2011/92/EU of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on combating the sexual abuse and sexual
exploitation of children and child pornography, and replacing Council Framework
Decision 2004/68/JHA, art. 25(2), available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:335:0001:0014:EN:PDF.
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decision concerning particular individual content, no type of
content filtering appears to be an acceptable means for achieving
routine compliance with local laws and regulations; usually, these
methods of filtering are viewed by the public with significant
skepticism, if not outrage. Academics have argued that the two
types of filtering should be prohibited as being contrary to the
freedom of speech,64 and recently the Court of Justice of the
European Union ruled that court-imposed, time-unlimited, general
filtering violates the European Union Charter of Fundamental
Rights and other EU legislation.65
The third method of raising borders on the Internet leaves the
burden upon responsible website operators66 and requires that they
take actions necessary to comply with territorially-defined
obligations. This method has several advantages. First, it avoids
the public outrage associated with governmental intrusions into
Internet traffic67 and potential constitutional and human rights
challenges that can arise because the intrusions may have the
character of censorship of speech.68 Second, the method relies on
64

See infra notes 319–22 and accompanying text; infra Part IV.B.3.
See Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs
et Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document
/document.jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=
first&part=1&cid=763036. The CJEU noted that the filtering at issue would violate the
rights of not only Internet users—―their right to protection of their personal data and their
freedom to receive or impart information,‖—but also Internet service providers—―the
freedom to conduct business.‖ Id. at ¶¶ 49, 50. The filtering was also held to be in
breach of the EU E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information
society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market) and other
related EU directives. Id. at ¶ 54; see case C-360/10, Belgische Vereinigung van Auteurs,
Componisten en Uitgevers (SABAM) v. Netlog NV (2012); see also infra note 67.
66
See supra note 6 (defining the term ―website operator‖ as used in this article).
67
See, e.g., Björn Greif, Löschen Statt Sperren: Bundesregierung Kippt
Zugangserschwerungsgesetz, ZDNET (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.zdnet.de/news/digitale_
wirtschaft_internet_ebusiness_loeschen_statt_sperren_bundesregierung_kippt_zugangser
schwerungsgesetz_story-39002364-41551361-1.htm (describing the recent developments
surrounding Zugangserschwerungsgesetz in Germany and the Digital Economy Act in the
United Kingdom); Josh Halliday, Digital Economy Act: Filesharing Code Delayed by Six
Months, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 5, 2011), http://guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/apr/05/
digital-economy-act-filesharing.
68
See infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing the constitutional aspect of the problem).
65
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the parties who actually know the content of the website at any
given moment and who should be able to assess their legal
obligations in various territorial contexts.69 Third, the method does
not challenge the status of Internet service providers as common
carriers eligible for safe harbors that protect them from secondary
liability.70 The safe harbors are based on the theory that common
carriers are unaware of the content that they carry and are
technically incapable of efficient monitoring of the content that
would allow them to prevent direct infringements. If governments
require and service providers execute the filtering of certain
content, the common carrier status could be in jeopardy.
The third method of raising borders on the Internet through
website operators is arguably preferable to the second method that
relies on filtering by Internet service providers; website operators
are better positioned to limit access to their websites to users from
certain countries or block access to users from other countries.
Website operators have utilized geolocation tools to achieve this
goal.

69

The situation is more complicated when operators, such as eBay or YouTube,
provide space for users to post their own content; the degree to which such operators are
able to monitor the content uploaded by the users is subject to debate. E.g., Content ID,
YOUTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/t/contentid (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). For a
choice-of-law perspective on the problem of potential operator liability for the conduct of
users, see generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al., The Law Applicable to Secondary
Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 201 (2009). See
also Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs Compositeurs et
Éditeurs (2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?
text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1
&cid=64604.
70
Internet service providers, or website operators operating search engines or public
fora for users‘ content, would not be the responsible parties if their liability is limited by
a safe harbor provision. See, e.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
512(g)(2) (2010); Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006); Directive
2001/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain
legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the
Internal Market, arts. 12–15, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1, 3.
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II. GEOLOCATION TOOLS
Before the next Part discusses cybertravel as the evasion of
geolocation, this Part reviews what geolocation tools are, who uses
them and for what purposes, and how the tools operate. As
explained earlier, geolocation tools have become one of the means
of erecting borders on the Internet; the tools can determine where
an Internet user is physically located and allow tailored content to
be delivered to that user based on the local regulatory framework
and other localized preferences. Currently these tools utilize
Internet protocol (―IP‖) addresses71 to localize Internet users;
however, in the future, geolocation tools might not need to rely on
IP addresses at all or solely on IP addresses72—additional or
different data points may serve as sources of information about an
Internet user‘s location.
A. Use of Geolocation Tools
If we regard the territorial partitioning of the Internet as an
undesirable outcome (meaning detrimental to the original idea of
the network),73 the story behind geolocation tools might indeed be
another example of Tim Wu‘s vicious ―Cycle‖74 because these
tools—like other technologies subject to Wu‘s ―Cycle‖—had
innocent beginnings. Apparently, the first desire to find out where
Internet users were located arose in the advertising industry when
advertisers wanted to target advertisements based on a user‘s
location.75 So, if you opened a page on your home computer, the
advertisers wanted you to be offered meals at your local
restaurants; if you opened the same page on your laptop while
connected to the Internet at a Chicago airport, the advertisers
wanted you to see advertisements for local Chicago restaurants.
71

See infra Part II.B (explaining the term ―IP address‖).
See infra notes 163–64 and accompanying text.
73
―The bordered Internet is widely viewed to be a dreadful development that is
antithetical to the Internet‘s ‗true‘ purposes and undermines the Internet‘s promise.‖
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 150.
74
See Wu, supra note 53; supra Part I.
75
―To the best of my knowledge, commercial Internet-based geographic analysis tools
have been available since no later than 1999 . . . .‖ Edelman, supra note 9, at 2. On the
history of geolocation see GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 58–61.
72
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Although it might be annoying to some that connecting to the
Internet during a short layover at the Frankfurt airport results in
Google assuming that you wish to use the German version of their
search engine,76 the general Internet population appears to prefer
the convenience of localized content.77
After they were applied in advertising, geolocation tools began
to be employed by those who were attempting to comply with
territorially-defined regulation.
Regulation continues to be
territorial; even in highly internationally-harmonized areas such as
copyright, differences among the laws of countries persist, so it is
desirable to tailor the accessibility of content on the Internet to the
requirements and limitations of individual countries. Website
operators use geolocation tools to comply with various regulatory
requirements—for instance, to satisfy restrictions that the U.S.
government imposes on exports to certain countries.78 Companies
may use geolocation tools to prevent customers from certain
countries from ordering electronic equipment because of safety
requirements that the particular country imposes on such
equipment sold for use in that country. Even if parties regulate
their affairs between themselves by private contract—for instance,

76
Although the German version of the website appears automatically, you can
manually switch it back to Google.com.
77
―[T]he explosive growth of the World Wide Web is directly attributable to the
invention of identification and filtering technologies that made it possible to organize and
select from the morass of available information.‖ Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1228–29.
―[G]eographical borders first emerged on the Internet not as a result of fiats by national
governments, but rather organically, from below, because Internet users around the globe
demanded different Internet experiences that corresponded to geography.‖ GOLDSMITH &
WU, supra note 26, at 49. On the various virtues of localized content, see id. at 50–53.
Some website operators believe that users want websites to go even further and offer not
only localized but also individualized content. Thus, if you like Indian food, when
connecting to the Internet from Chicago, not only will you see only ads for Chicago
restaurants, but those ads will be limited to restaurants serving Indian food. While
localization of content may always be achieved by applying geolocation tools without
retaining identifiable data on user behavior, individualization of content requires the
collection and retention of identifiable data on individual users, which creates personal
data protection issues. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing anonymization).
78
Michael Geist mentioned that Microsoft was using geolocation tools ―to comply
with U.S. regulations prohibiting the export of strong-encryption Web browser software.‖
Geist, supra note 41, at 334.
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by obtaining a copyright license for certain content—their
contracts may be limited territorially.
Often the uses of geolocation serve multiple purposes.79 For
example, online gaming websites use geolocation tools both to
comply with local gaming regulations and to prevent fraud.80 First,
geolocation is employed to help ensure that customers will not
access gaming sites from countries that impose prohibitions or
limitations on Internet gaming.81 William Hill, one of the largest
bookmakers in the United Kingdom and also an online gaming
operator, uses geolocation tools to prevent U.S. players from
accessing its gaming products that are legal in the United
Kingdom, but expose various entities involved in the operation to
liability in the United States.82 The second purpose for which the
gaming industry uses geolocation tools is to identify potential
credit card fraud.83 If the address given to the issuing bank does
79

TV stations and other online content providers may have various reasons for limiting
access to content from certain countries—copyright licensing issues are not the only
reason. See infra note 180; see also Frequently Asked Questions: BBC Help, BBC
http://faq.external.bbc.co.uk/questions/ bbc_online/website_changes (last visited July 28,
2011). As a result of these various limitations, for instance, you cannot access episodes
of The Tonight Show when you are in Germany; the NBC website will not play the video
once it detects your foreign location. THE TONIGHT SHOW, http://www.nbc.com/thetonight-show/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). Similarly, the German television station
SAT1 will not allow you to watch Kommissar Rex from a U.S. location; upon opening
the webpage you will receive a message explaining that the content is not available in the
United States. KOMMISSAR REX, http://www.sat1.de/filme_serien/rex/ (last visited Nov.
19, 2011). Users have reported that Netflix will not allow them to download a film if
they access their U.S. Netflix account from a location outside the United States. I am
indebted to my colleague, Professor Stacey Tovino of the William S. Boyd School of
Law, for the observation about Netflix. Other Netflix users have reported the same
problem.
80
See generally JULIA HÖRNLE & BRIGITTE ZAMMIT, CROSS-BORDER ONLINE
GAMBLING LAW AND POLICY (2010); see also Tricia Lines Hill, Harnessing the Power to
Stop Fraud, IVERTECH, http://software.ivertech.com/_ivertechArticle15229_
HarnessingthePowerto StopFraud.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
81
I am indebted to Gregory R. Gemignani of Lionel Sawyer & Collins, Las Vegas,
Nevada, for an insightful discussion about the uses of geolocation in the gaming industry.
82
WILLIAM HILL, http://casino.williamhill.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
83
On geolocation in preventing credit card fraud see GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26,
at 61; see also Hill, supra note 80; Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction, Internet
Commerce, and Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation
Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 61, 76 (2011).
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not match the physical address that is self-reported by the Internet
user at registration (as confirmed by the geolocation tools), the
operator is alerted and may take additional measures to ensure that
the player is a legitimate user of the credit card.
The list of reasons for the voluntary use of geolocation tools
goes beyond achieving legal compliance or preventing fraud, and
includes purposes such as implementing differential pricing,
localizing advertising, and Internet searching. Of course, illegal
operations also utilize the tools in support of their illegal
activities.84 A Hong Kong website operator, who purposefully
engaged in activities that appeared to infringe intellectual property
rights, used the tools to limit the site‘s exposure to local authorities
by making sure that it did not infringe any rights in Hong Kong.
To meet this goal, the company employed geolocation tools to
make sure that no user from Hong Kong could download an
infringing work posted on its website, but simultaneously
permitted users connected from other countries to download the
content.85
In an important development for the future of geolocation, and
consequently also for the future of cybertravel, governments are
turning to geolocation as an enforcement tool—a means to force
Internet actors to comply with regulatory decisions and court
orders. For example, regulators in Italy have mandated that
gaming websites use geolocation tools to prevent users located in
Italy from accessing certain content.86 The U.S. Department of
84

For this example I am indebted to Douglas Clark of Hogan Lovells International
LLP, Shanghai, China.
85
See MEGAUPLOAD, http://www.megaupload.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). For
information on cross-border enforcement difficulties in intellectual property cases see
generally Marketa Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions in U.S. Patent Cases and Their
Enforcement Abroad, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 331 (2009) [hereinafter Trimble,
Cross-Border Injunctions]; Marketa Trimble Landova, The Public Policy Exception to
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Cases of Copyright Infringement, 40 INTL.
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 642 (2009).
86
According to NeuStar (formerly Quova), a geolocation tools provider,
―[g]eolocation technology is a requirement in online licensing applications in Italy. . . .
An operator wishing to obtain an online gaming licence in Italy is required to note during
its license application the technology that will be used for geolocation. . . . The use of
geolocation technology is required in order to enable an operator to identify the
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Justice made it a condition of its agreement with PokerStars, an
online gaming company operating from the Isle of Man,87 that the
company ―utilize geographic blocking technology relating to I.P.
addresses.‖88 In Germany, several courts have unequivocally
accepted geolocation as ―a viable and technically feasible method
of determining website visitors‘ location[s]‖89 and ordered online
gaming operators to utilize geolocation tools to limit access to
certain content from particular German states.90 Recent legislative
efforts also show the need for clear jurisdictional borders on the
Internet, whether they are efforts in the areas of Internet
commerce91 or online gaming.92

geographical origin of the player who attempts to access the gaming website. This is
needed in order to prevent Italians having access to non-authorised sites managed by the
same operator. . . . France has studied Italy‘s model and has developed a similar system
which is expected to come into force some time during the year.‖ NEUSTAR, Geolocation;
Ensuring Compliance with Online Gaming Regulations 6 (2010), www.neustar.biz.
87
About PokerStars, POKERSTARS.NET, http://www.pokerstars.net/about/ (last visited
Nov. 19, 2011).
88
Letter from Preet Bharara, U.S. Att‘y, S.D.N.Y., to David M. Zornow, et al.,
Partners, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (Apr. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.rakeback.com/images/doj-pokerstars-domain-name-reinstatement.pdf. In this
case, the U.S. government‘s leverage over the company has been the company‘s U.S.registered domain name.
89
See Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG] [Higher Administrative
Court] July 2, 2010, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 50510 (Ger.) (the decision
refers to other German cases in which the German courts agreed that geolocation may be
used to comply with their territorially-limited decisions); Oberverwaltungsgericht
Nordrhein-Westfalen [OVG] [Higher Administrative Court] July 13, 2010, BECK-ONLINE
DATENBANK [BECKRS] 51049 (Ger.). On the initial approaches by German courts to the
use of geolocation see Michael Winkelmüller & Hans-Wolfram Kessler,
Territorialisierung von Internet-Angeboten – Technische Möglichkeiten, völker-,
wirtschaftsverwaltungs- und ordnungsrechtliche Aspekte, 5 GEWARCH 181, 181–83
(2009).
90
But cf. Oberverwaltungsgericht Lüneburg [OVG] [Higher Administrative Court]
Apr. 3, 2009, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 33166 (Ger.) (an earlier opinion by a
German court concerning geolocation). ―[I]t is not without a question whether at this
time enough technically matured possibilities exist to exclude the Internet access only
from Lower Saxony.‖ Id.
91
See, e.g., H.R. 10-1193, 67th Gen. Assemb., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Co. 2010) (enforcing
online sales tax), enforcement temporarily stayed by an injunction.
92
See, e.g., Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109347, §5362 (10)(B)(ii)(I), 120 Stat. 1952, 1955; H.R. 2267, 111th Cong., §5381(5)(B),
§5383(b) (2009).
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Sufficiently reliable geolocation tools,93 if used appropriately
and with due regard to protection of privacy,94 could indeed assist
in effective regulation and enforcement on the Internet.95 Defined
borders on the Internet would also benefit Internet actors who
could deal with their rights on a country-by-country basis. Such
partitioning makes entries into markets less costly for smaller
entities because they do not have to bear the expense of a
worldwide license, and country-by-country rights give rightholders the opportunity to maximize their profits by seeking the
best licensing opportunities.96
93

On accuracy of the tools see infra section II.B.
For a project concerned with the protection of privacy (personal data protection) in
geolocation see Barnes et al., supra note 8, at 5–6.
95
Clarification of online jurisdictional boundaries for purposes of determining
personal jurisdiction over an actor on the Internet would also be beneficial. Although
courts in the world are refining their approaches to asserting personal jurisdiction over
actors acting on the Internet, the tests leave Internet users with no clear rules. Some of
the ―low-tech‖ factors used in personal jurisdiction analyses appear to be losing
relevance; for instance, the fact that a website utilizes a particular top-level country
domain (such as .de or .fr) might not say much about the website‘s intentions to target or
avoid users in a particular country when users no longer type in website addresses but
instead locate websites through search engines that link users directly to the sites. With
English becoming the universal language of the Internet it might be increasingly difficult
to claim that a website in English is not directed at a jurisdiction in which English is not
the primary or official language. See Joined Cases C-585/08 & C-144/09, Peter Pammer
v. Reederei Karl Schluter GmbH & Co. KG and Hotel Aplenhof GesmbH v. Oliver
Heller, ¶ 84 (2010), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ LexUriServ.do?uri
=CELEX:62008CJ0585:EN:HTML (noting that ―the language or the currency used . . .
do not constitute relevant factors for the purpose of determining‖ personal jurisdiction).
Similarly, the fact that a website is interactive, although originally viewed by courts as a
determinative factor in the personal jurisdiction inquiry, is no longer considered
determinative on its own by many courts. See, e.g., id. at ¶ 79 (noting that the distinction
between ―interactive‖ and other websites ―is not decisive‖); see also Illinois v. Hemi Grp.
LLC, 622 F.3d 754, 758 (7th Cir. 2010). The fact that a website employs geolocation
tools might be a persuasive argument for the absence of personal jurisdiction over a
website operator who uses the tools to prevent users from certain jurisdictions from
accessing its website. See generally King, supra note 83 (discussing geolocation tools
and personal jurisdiction).
96
It is possible that the right owner may determine that a worldwide license is the best
option; however, partitioning may give the right owner a bargaining advantage. For a
contrary view in the context of the EU single market see Joined Cases C-403/08 & C429/08, Football Ass‘n Premier League Ltd. et al. v. QC Leisure et al. and Karen Murphy
v. Media Prot. Svcs. Ltd. (2011), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008C0403:EN:HTML.
94
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B. Operation of Geolocation Tools
Geolocation in the broadest sense is any means of detecting an
Internet user‘s location. The raison d‘être of geolocation tools is
the determination of the physical location of a user; the tools are
not designed to identify or track a particular user. Although they
may use information that identifies a particular device that is used
to access the Internet, such information is not necessarily sufficient
to identify a particular user.97 Absent implantation of a device into
a human body, it will remain a challenge to attribute acts on the
Internet to a particular human actor if more than one person has
access to a device.98 Despite this shortcoming, geolocation tools
are being designed, used, and constantly improved because of the
value that is attached to the ability to identify a user‘s location.
The most basic geolocation tools are based on self-reporting.
For instance, an Internet website that requires registration asks a
user for his location. Based on the information input by the user,
the website tailors the content according to the regulations of the
country where the user is located.99 Another self-reporting
mechanism offers users a list of countries in a dropdown menu,
and after the user selects a country, the website directs the user to

97

In cases of dynamically assigned IP addresses, the same IP address may lead to
different devices at different times. Statically assigned or embedded IP addresses can
identify a particular device but cannot link the device to a particular user if several users
have physical or virtual access to the device. For more on statically and dynamically
assigned IP addresses see infra notes 107–15 and accompanying text. A device may also
be identified by ―fingerprinting‖ methods that can recognize the same machine repeatedly
by various indicators other than—or in combination with—an IP address. See, e.g.,
PANOPTICLICK, http://panopticlick.eff.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
98
Former Google CEO Eric Schmidt was quoted as commenting on the need for
attribution on the Internet: ―In a world of asynchronous threats, it is too dangerous for
there not to be some way to identify you. We need a [verified] name service for people.
Governments will demand it.‖ Gareth Beavis, Schmidt: We Can Predict Where You Are
Going to Go, TECHRADAR (Aug. 6, 2010), http://www.techradar.com/news/internet/
schmidt-we-can-predict-where-you-are-going-to-go-708339.
99
This is what Seth Finkelstein called ―co-operative geo-location‖ as opposed to
―oppositional geo-location.‖ ―[I]t is in the interests of the party being located to cooperate with supplying geographic information, in order to gain some benefit.‖ Expert
Report of Seth Finkelstein, Nitke v. Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d. 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (No.
01 Civ. 11476).
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its country-specific pages.100 Self-reporting is certainly sufficient
for advertising purposes or for purposes of facilitating convenient
content (such as pricing in local currency), but it is certainly not a
tool for enforcement. Even if the self-reporting is part of a user
agreement or licensing agreement, the benefits of the agreement or
the threat of contractual sanctions under the agreement may not be
sufficient incentives for users to report accurate information.
However, if the self-reported location data are reliable, and if they
are collected and retained, they may be used to recognize the same
user in the future101 or help identify the location of additional
users.102 Naturally, any such activity raises serious privacy
concerns.103

100

See, e.g., BRITISH AIRWAYS, http://www.britishairways.com/travel/country_choice
/public/en_us (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
101
―A simple way to find out the geographic location of a user visiting a Web site is to
ask them . . . Location data, once entered, can thereafter be associated with a client IP
address.‖ James A. Muir & Paul C. Van Oorschot, Internet Geolocation: Evasion and
Counterevasion, ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS, Dec. 2009, at 4:1, 4:8.
102
Three experts who work for Facebook have estimated the location of users based on
their ―friends‖ in social media, thus exploring the probability of friendship as a function
of distance. Lars Backstrom et. al., Find Me If You Can: Improving Geographical
Prediction with Social and Spatial Proximity, WORLD WIDE WEB CONFERENCE, 61 (Apr.
26–30, 2010), http://delivery.acm.org/10.1145/1780000/1772698/p61-backstrom.pdf?ip=
150.108.239.43&acc=ACTIVE%20SERVICE&CFID=64593187&CFTOKEN=5529153
9&__acm__=1328312060_1287e167fe6e65e8e6f255474345c4ab (a paper presented at
the 2010 World Wide Web Conference).
103
―If IP addresses are considered ‗personal data‘ or ‗personal information‘ for privacy
purposes, the collection, use and disclosure of such information may be seriously
restricted.‖ Dan Jerker B. Svantesson, Geo-Location Technologies and Other Means of
Placing Borders on the ―Borderless‖ Internet, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L.
101, 134 (2004) [hereinafter Svantesson, Placing Boarders]. See Bundesgericht [BGer]
[Federal Supreme Court] Sept. 8, 2010, 136 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN
BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 508 (Switz.) (discussing IP addresses as personal data);
Jennifer Valentino-Devries & Emily Steel, ―Cookies‖ Cause Bitter Backlash, WALL ST.
J. (Sept. 19, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487044169045755022
6133569370.html (―Since July, at least six suits have been filed in U.S. District Court for
the Central District of California against websites and companies that create advertising
technology, accusing them of installing online-tracking tools that are so surreptitious that
they essentially hack into users‘ machines without their knowledge. All of the suits seek
class-action status and accuse companies of violating the federal Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and other laws against deceptive practices.‖). See Barnes et al., supra note 8,
at 5–6.
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Other methods of identifying the location of Internet users
involve reliance on information that is presumably difficult for
users to conceal or change. For instance, any website that requires
payment by credit card may use the purchaser‘s billing address as a
reliable indicator of the user‘s location. An online store may
conclude that most delivery addresses will coincide with a
purchaser‘s location. An airline may assume that the country of
departure on a plane ticket is an accurate proxy for the country
where the traveler is located. These indicators are clearly not
perfect; travelers do not always purchase tickets to depart from
their current location, purchasers do not always buy from the same
location to which they wish goods to be delivered, and people do
not always carry credit cards with billing addresses that correspond
to their current location. Although less susceptible to manipulation
than self-reporting, these other methods also fail as sufficiently
reliable enforcement tools.
Geolocation tools provide a higher, though also not perfect,
degree of reliability. These tools rely on the IP addresses of
devices with which users access the Internet and are known as ―IP
geolocation‖ tools.104
IP addresses are often described as
―analogous to . . . physical mailing address[es],‖105 because they
allow for accurate transmittal and receipt of data.106 As for their
utility in localizing users, their use is more complicated than the
use of physical addresses because often IP addresses are not
static—meaning permanently assigned to particular devices—but
are assigned dynamically (and temporarily)107 to those devices. By
104

―Informally, Internet geolocation is the problem of determining the physical
location (to some level of granularity) of an Internet user. A related but more specific
term is IP geolocation, which refers to the problem of locating an Internet host using only
its IP address.‖ Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 2; see also SVANTESSON,
http://www.svantesson.org/projects/geo-identification/free-geo-location-tools.aspx (last
visited Nov. 19, 2011) (providing examples of free geolocation tools).
105
Joshua J. McIntyre, Balancing Expectations of Online Privacy: Why Internet
Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected As Personally Identifiable Information, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 900 (2011).
106
See, e.g., McIntyre, supra note 105 (discussing IP addresses).
107
Although it is possible to assign static IP addresses dynamically, this paper uses the
term ―dynamically assigned IP address‖ to refer to the practice of dynamically assigning
an IP address for a temporary period of time.
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analogy, imagine an apartment complex that has one street number
and one hundred apartment numbers. A static IP address would be
similar to a complete address with the street number and apartment
number, which would never change and always identify the same
apartment. Using a dynamically assigned IP address would be
similar to using the address of the apartment complex main office,
which assigns in rotation the reusable numbers 1 to 100 to the
apartments as people rent various apartments in the building; in
this case only the office would know at any given moment which
apartment was identified as, say, apartment 57. Similarly, only
Internet service providers know at any given moment which
dynamically assigned IP addresses are assigned to which users.108
Dynamically assigned IP addresses have become a standard
feature of Internet connections since IP addresses became scarce in
recent years because of the exhaustion of all addresses that are
available under the currently prevailing Internet protocol in use—
IPv4.109 Because of the insufficient supply of IP addresses under
this protocol (and as of February 2011 all IPv4 addresses were
officially assigned),110 Internet service providers have commonly
held a pool of reusable IP addresses that they assign to various
users temporarily and reassign to other users as users log on and
off the Internet. The successor to IPv4, IPv6,111 offers 340
undecillion IP addresses112 and therefore allows for static addresses
to be assigned to or embedded in all individual Internet-connected

108

Internet service providers know which IP address is assigned to which account;
naturally, they cannot identify which particular user (person, family member, colleague)
is actually accessing the Internet with the device using the IP address.
109
Experts have warned about the shortage of available IP addresses, and ―[a]s of 3
February 2011, the central pool of available IPv4 addresses managed by the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) has been depleted.‖ IPv4 Depletion and IPv6
Deployment FAQs, NO. RESOURCE ORG., http://www.nro.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/
02/nro_depletion_deployment_faq.pdf (last visited Nov. 19. 2011).
110
See Available Pool of Unallocated IPv4 Internet Addresses Now Completely
Emptied, ICANN (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.icann.org/en/news/releases/release-03feb11en.pdf.
111
See What is IPv6?, IPV6 ACT NOW, http://www.ipv6actnow.org/ (last visited Nov.
19, 2011).
112
See id. 340 undecillion is 3.4 x 1038.
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devices,113 opening the way to new business models and
technological innovations that may utilize advantages associated
with certainty of identification and traceability of devices with
permanent and identifiable IP addresses.114 For now though, many
IP addresses continue to be dynamically assigned.115
Once a device connects to the Internet it announces its IP
address and thus allows others to geolocate it.116 The problem with
geolocation is that there is no centralized register of all IP
addresses that lists corresponding physical devices;117 lists exist
113

See McIntyre, supra note 105, at 901 (―Unlike current IP addresses, IPv6 addresses
will include a unique code dictated by a computer‘s hardware, in effect making IPv6
addresses globally unique and permanently assigned to particular devices. IPv6 is
unlikely to suffer from the address exhaustion that plagues the current protocol: the new
system creates a 128-bit address, providing for approximately 340 undecillion . . .
possible addresses.‖). Naturally, this development worries those who are concerned
about privacy on the Internet. See, e.g., Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values
With Technology, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 288, 299 (2001) (―IPv6, a proposed TCP/IP
protocol for Internet communication, could be the nail in the coffin of anonymity on the
Internet.‖).
114
For instance, household appliances may be connected to the Internet and easily
recognized if they have static IP addresses. This raises important privacy issues. See
generally Barnes et al., supra note 8.
115
The adoption of IPv6 did not keep up with the growing needs for IP addresses, and
since IPv4 addresses could be assigned dynamically the adoption of IPv6 was not an
imperative. However, we will probably see an acceleration in the adoption of IPv6 now
since IP addresses under IPv4 were finally exhausted in February 2011 and there is a
dramatically growing number of devices that require connection to the Internet. See
Dylan Tweney, No Easy Fixes as Internet Runs out of Addresses, WIRED (Feb. 3, 2001),
http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2011/02/Internet-addresses/. Users may purposefully
change dynamically assigned IP address by powering off and on their routers. See Riva
Richmond, Resisting the Online Tracking Programs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2010, at B7,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/11/technology/personaltech/11basics.html.
116
For an easy-to-understand explanation of the functioning of the traffic on the
Internet, see Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, in THE EMERGENT GLOBAL
INFORMATION POLICY REGIME 203, 204–07 (Sandra Braman ed., 2004).
117
This is what Dan Jerker B. Svantesson refers to as ―source problems.‖ See Dan
Jerker B. Svantesson, The Impact of Geo-location Technologies on Internet Content
Licensing – Let the ―Cat and Mouse‖ Game Begin, Intellectual Property Forum, No. 63,
Dec. 2005, at 25 [hereinafter Svantesson, Cat and Mouse]. On ―circumvention
problems‖ see infra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Edelman, supra note 9, at
3–4; Thomas Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation – Technische Ansätze zu einer
Reterritorialisierung des Internet, 1 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 3 (2007) (―[T]he
decentralized management of the Internet means that there is no authoritative database of
host locations.‖) [hereinafter Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation]; Ethan Katz-Bassett et al.,
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that provide some information but none are complete and updated
in real time. Although geolocation tool providers use lists and
databases—both publicly accessible lists and lists obtained from
other sources118—these data sources are often not sufficient and
the providers may complement the functioning of their tools by
utilizing other geolocation techniques. In their 2009 paper Internet
Geolocation: Evasion and Counterevasion, apparently the first
scientific paper to address the technical issues of both geolocation
and geolocation evasion comprehensively,119 James A. Muir and
Paul C. Van Oorschot provide an overview of other geolocation
techniques.120 Among the techniques they list are estimates based
on the time that it takes for the device in question to respond to a
ping request (a request for response) from another device with a
known geographical location,121 and estimates based on the routing
of packets that carry information through the network.122
Combinations of methods are reported to yield the best results.123

Towards IP Geolocation Using Delay and Topology Measurements, IMC‘06, Oct. 25–27,
2006, available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1177090.
118
See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 4–8, 10; see also Bamba Gueye et al.
Constraint-Based Geolocation of Internet Hosts, 14 IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON
NETWORKING 1219, 1220 (Dec. 2006); European Location Study, PTOLEMUS CONSULTING
GRP., 92 (July 2010), http://www.quova.com/downloads/wp-freestudylaunch0707.pdf
(reporting that Quova used a list of locations of 2.6 billion IP addresses).
119
There are earlier scientific papers on geolocation, but if they mention evasion at all,
they do so only briefly. For legal papers on geolocation that mention evasion see infra
note 133.
120
See generally Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101.
121
See id. at 8 (―However, the time for IP packets to travel between two hosts at fixed
locations varies.‖); see also Katz-Bassett et al., supra note 117, at 72 (―[O]ur study
reveals that techniques based solely on network measurements have inherent
limitations.‖); cf. Gueye et al., supra note 118, at 1219 (―[W]e propose Constraint-Based
Geolocation (CBG), which infers the geographic location of Internet hosts using
multilateration with distance constraints, thus establishing a continuous space of answers
instead of a discrete one. . . . Our experimental results show that CBG outperforms the
previous geolocation techniques.‖).
122
See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 10.
123
On the effectiveness of combining several methods of geolocation see for example
Backstrom et al., supra note 102, at 69 (―[T]he addition of social information to the task
of predicting physical location produces measurable improvement in accuracy when
compared to standard IP-based methods.‖).

598

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:567

The accuracy of geolocation tools is subject to debate;124 less
debate has occurred on the question of what degree of accuracy
should be expected if these tools are to be considered tools of
compliance with regulatory and enforcement measures.125 Not
surprisingly, entities that sell geolocation tools claim that their
tools are highly effective;126 critics tend to question the providers‘
data and point out that even if geolocation tool providers publish
data on the effectiveness of their tools, it is difficult to verify the
data because most providers ―do not publish their results, nor
detailed information about their methods.‖127 Muir and Van
Oorschot have also noted that the data reported by providers about
the high accuracy of the tools ―typically assume no evasive action
by users.‖128
124

For a discussion of opposing views on the issue of effectiveness of geolocation tools
by two German Courts—the Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof and Thüringer
Oberverwaltungsgericht—see for example Hörnle & Zammit, supra note 80, at 38–39.
See also Verwaltungsgericht München [VG] [Administrative Trial Courts] Nov. 20,
2008, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 40756 (Ger.); Verwaltungsgericht Karlsruhe
[VG] [Administrative Trial Courts] Dec. 17, 2007, BECK-ONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS]
33500 (Ger.).
125
For an interesting discussion about the expected level of accuracy of geolocation for
purposes of compliance with a court order, see Oberverwaltungsgericht NordrheinWestfalen [OVG] [Higher Administrative Court] July 2, 2010, BECK-ONLINE
DATENBANK [BECKRS] 50510 (Ger.) (―[T]he appellant is not required to exclude
perfectly participation from Nordrhein-Westfalen in its Internet game of chance. It is
only ordered that measures [of geolocation as ordered by the court] be introduced by the
deadline [set by the court] and thereby the access from Nordrhein-Westfalen is
significantly limited.‖). See generally Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions, supra note 85,
at 349.
126
See Geolocation: Ensuring Compliance with Online Gaming Regulations, supra
note 86, at 8 (―Using IP Intelligence data from Neustar, Ladbrokes was able to comply
with [a Dutch Supreme Court] ruling by blocking online users from locations inside the
Netherlands–a task that was achieved with virtually 100% accuracy.‖); see also European
Location Study, supra note 118. On the accuracy of geolocation tools, see also
Svantesson, supra note 103, at 111 ff. For older data on other services, see Thomas
Hoeren, Geolokalisation und Glücksspielrecht (Teil 2), 5 ZEITSCHFRIFT FÜR WETT-UND
GLÜCKSSPIELRECHT 311, 312–13 (2008) [hereinafter Hoeren, Geolokalisation];
Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location, supra note 28, at 13–15.
127
See Edelman, supra note 9, at 6; Svantesson, Placing Boarders, supra note 103, at
112.
128
Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 21. On the question of the accuracy of
geolocation tools see Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location, supra note 28, at 13–
20.
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It is questionable whether we should require impermeable
barriers from website operators who utilize geolocation to comply
with regulation,129 and whether operators should be expected to
detect geolocation evasion. Evasion techniques will continue to be
developed and it might be technologically impossible to preempt
their development and use. Perhaps this is where ―code‖ in the
legal sense cannot be unequivocally shaped by ―code‖ in the
technical sense; maybe this is one of the cases in which legal rules
have to intervene and provide support for the technical solutions,
which in this case are endangered by evasion techniques that
enable cybertravel.
III. EVASION OF GEOLOCATION
The seminal problem of geolocation is that techniques exist
that allow users to thwart geolocation tools.130 Ben Laurie, the
expert who provided testimony on geolocation in the well-known
Yahoo! case in France,131 pointed out that, in fact, ―it is
fantastically easy to deliberately evade geolocation.‖132
Notwithstanding the interest of governments and various actors on
the Internet in geolocation as a means of achieving compliance
with regulation and enforcement, and the fact that evasion may
render geolocation largely ineffective, evasion techniques have
been mentioned in the literature only marginally.133 Even in the

129

For ―A Brief History of Geolocation and the Law‖ see Kevin F. King, Geolocation
and Federalism on the Internet: Cutting Internet Gambling‘s Gordian Knot, 11 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 41, 59–63 (2010); see also Trimble, Cross-Border Injunctions,
supra note 85, at 349.
130
See Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 25 (referring to these techniques
as ―circumvention problems.‖); see also Hoeren, Zoning and Geolocation, supra note
117.
131
For the response in the United States to the litigation in France, see Yahoo!, Inc. v.
La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L‘Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006). Ben
Laurie was also a founding director of the Apache Software Foundation. See Ben Laurie,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ben_Laurie (last visited Dec. 19, 2011).
132
See Declaration of Bennet Laurie in Lieu of Direct Testimony at 12, Nitke v.
Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 01 Civ. 11476) (emphasis added).
133
See, e.g., Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 24–30; Hoeren, Zoning and
Geolocation, supra note 117; Thomas Hoeren, Das Pferd frisst keinen Gurkensalat –
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scientific literature it was not until December 2009 that the first
paper was published that focused fully on the techniques for
evading geolocation.134 Although a number of legal papers have
been authored on geolocation and its legal implications, only two
short articles135 have addressed the legal issues associated with
geolocation evasion tools or cybertravel.136 However, interest in
cybertravel will increase as geolocation becomes omnipresent and
evasion tools even more user-friendly than they are today.
A spectrum of evasion techniques is available and a variety of
providers offer means of evasion with various levels of
sophistication.137 Of course, remote access to computers that
would have resulted in evasion of geolocation existed long before
some of the current ―mainstream‖ cybertravel tools emerged. For
example, the Telnet and SSH protocols both allow logins to remote
computers, and today commercial services such as GoToMyPC138
and LogMeIn139 make it easy for a user to remotely access a
computer located anywhere in the world, thereby facilitating the

Überlegung zur Internet Governance, 36 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN 2615 (2008);
Hoeren, Geolokalisation, supra note 126; King, supra note 83, at 71.
134
Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 2 (―In contrast to our work, the academic
literature to date on Internet geolocation techniques . . . has generally implicitly assumed
that no evasive action is being taken.‖). Id. at 21 (―[W]e know of no open study of
evasive geolocation prior to the present article, a preliminary version of which was
captured in a technical report [in 2006].‖). The technical report is available at
http://www.scs.carleton.ca/research/tech_reports/2006/download/TR-06-05.pdf
(last
visited Nov. 19, 2011). For an earlier paper discussing evasion techniques see Edelman,
supra note 9.
135
See Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 24–30; Sven Mitsdörffer & Ulf
Gutfleisch, ―Geo-Sperren‖ – wenn Videoportale ausländische Nutzer aussperren: Eine
urheberrechtliche Betrachtung, 11 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 731 (2009).
136
Other than in the articles noted supra in footnote 135, the possibility of evasion is
mentioned only as a side note in the literature. See, e.g., Johnson & Post, supra note 49,
at 1374 (brief mention of the possibility to ―simply reconfigure [the user‘s] connection so
as to appear to reside in a location outside the particular territory.‖).
137
This Part leaves aside instances of ―accidental cybertravel‖—instances in which an
Internet user‘s IP address is altered without the user‘s knowledge or intent. See
Backstrom, et al., supra note 102, at 61; Expert Report of Ben Laurie at 17, Nitke v.
Ashcroft, 253 F. Supp. 2d 587 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 01 Civ. 11476).
138
See GOTOMYPC, http://www.gotomypc.com/remote_access/remote_access (last
visited Nov. 19, 2011).
139
See LOGMEIN, https://secure.logmein.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
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use of the remote computer‘s Internet connection and foreign IP
address. This type of cybertravel can be described as ―selfsustained‖ because it is facilitated by equipment that a user may
own or have available through family or friends in another
country.140 As opposed to these ―self-sustained‖ cybertravel
methods, the ―mainstream‖ cybertravel tools that are described
below do not rely on a user‘s own equipment or equipment to
which a user specifically secures access in advance.
Most Internet users who remember the beginnings of the
Internet are familiar with the most basic geolocation evasion
technique, although they do not usually think of it as a tool for
evading geolocation. It is the use of a dial-up connection to an
Internet service provider phone number in a foreign country.141
Once connected to the foreign dial-up service provider, the user is
assigned an IP address for that country by the foreign provider, and
it appears as if the user is located in the foreign country. The
problems with this technique are the cost and speed of the
connection. The speed problem is familiar to anyone who has ever
used a dial-up connection, and calling a telephone number in a
foreign country for an extended period of time can still be
expensive. Although subject to these disadvantages, this form of
cybertravel could be the only cybertravel available if a government
shuts down the Internet throughout the country by ordering all
Internet service providers to stop providing access to the network,
as the government of Egypt did in January 2011.142
140

The use of a user‘s own equipment makes the ―self-sustained‖ cybertravel similar to
the Slingbox concept. See infra note 259.
141
See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 13.
142
See Evgeny Mozorov, Egypt Action May Spread Internet Kill Switch Idea, SAN
FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Feb. 6, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?f
=%2Fc%2Fa%2F2011%2F02%2F05%2FINO91HHD7P.DTL. Although it was the
situation in Egypt in January 2011 that raised general attention to the problem of
governmental interference with access to the Internet, there were other instances of
smaller countries (Nepal and Burma) engaging in the same tactics (in 2005 and 2007,
respectively). See Christopher Beam, Egypt Protest Internet Shut Off: How Did the
Egyptian Government Turn Off the Internet?, SLATE (Jan. 28, 2011),
http://www.slate.com/id/2283000/. For a detailed account of the Internet disconnection
in Egypt, see James Crowie, Egypt Leaves the Internet, RENESYS BLOG (Jan. 27, 2011),
http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet.shtml.
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Another cybertravel technique involves the use of a proxy IP
address: users connect to the Internet through special software or a
website that reroutes their connection, shields their IP address, and
uses its own, creating the appearance in cyberspace that the user is
connected through another device in another location. The easiest
of these proxy tools to use, but the least likely to function well
enough to satisfy most purposes for which cybertravel is desired, is
a website in which users insert the Internet addresses of pages
blocked by geolocation tools. The website then opens the
requested pages on the users‘ behalf.143 The major problem with
this system for users is that the requested websites easily recognize
a proxy and can simply block all access by the proxy.144
Another type of proxy service is the easy–to–use subscription
services that allow users, for a fee, to sign in on a website and be
reconnected through a proxy. There are variations of these
services based on the audience that they target; some services
focus primarily on customers interested in anonymization—
Internet users who are concerned about their privacy.145 These
services, such as Anonymizer,146 promise anonymity on the Internet
by rerouting users to a neutral IP address—an IP address that is
located somewhere that ―do[es] not create suspicion.‖147 Some
users wish to obtain an IP address from a particular country; 148 for
instance, in addition to anonymization, Anonymizer also offers a

143
See, e.g., ANONYMOUSE, http://anonymouse.org/anonwww.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2011); MADMANWEB, http://www.madmanweb.com/anon.html (last visited Nov. 19,
2011).
144
Svantesson has noted additional problems: because the websites are so easy to use
they are quickly overloaded by users; additionally, they offer ―only a limited number of
countries one can appear to be located in.‖ Svantesson, The Accuracy of Geo-Location,
supra note 28, at 17–18.
145
For more on anonymization and its relationship to cybertravel, see Part IV.B.2.
146
See ANONYMIZER, http://www.anonymizer.com/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
147
See How It Works, ANONYMIZER, http://www.anonymizer.com/business/how_it_
works.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
148
For instance, the following website offers advice on how to connect via a German IP
address. Although the advice is of general application, the website targets users who
wish to appear as if they are connected to the Internet from Germany. See Change Your
IP Address to Germany, IPRIVACYTOOLS, http://www.iprivacytools.com/ip-addressgermany/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
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Geographic Distribution technology, which allows users to select
the geographical location of their proxy IP address.149
There are also services that specialize in cybertravel to certain
countries.
For instance, My Expat Network150 provides
connections to users who want to watch U.K. television programs
but are located outside the United Kingdom and cannot access the
programs because of geolocation. For £5 per month they can sign
in to My Expat Network and watch all the television shows that are
on U.K. websites as if they were connected from inside the United
Kingdom.151 The same provider offers the same service, for $6.50
per month, to users outside the United States who want to watch
U.S. television programs but are unable to do so because they are
connected to the Internet with an outside-of-the-U.S. IP address
and face similar access restrictions.152 Once they appear to be
connected from inside the United States, these users may access
not only television programs but any other content that may be
viewed only from within the United States.
One free proxy service that is more sophisticated than the
services described above utilizes a series of proxies, for instance
―private proxies‖—volunteers who provide access to their
machines to people from other countries, such as political activists
who fear detection and persecution in their own countries.153 The
Tor project,154 which enjoys significant funding from the U.S.
government,155 uses a chain of proxies to protect its users,156 who
149

See Success Stories, ANONYMIZER, http://www.anonymizer.com/business/success_
stories.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
150
See MY EXPAT NETWORK, http://www.my-expat-network.co.uk/ (last visited Nov.
19, 2011).
151
See id.
152
See id.
153
See Tor: Overview, TOR, http://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en#the
solution (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
154
See TOR, http://www.torproject.org/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
155
About seventy-five percent of Tor funding comes from the U.S. government.
Interview with Andrew Lewman, Executive Director, Tor, WBUR.ORG, Jan. 31, 2011,
available at http://hereandnow.wbur.org/2011/01/31/egypt-Internet-government.
156
See Karsten Loesing, et al., A Case Study on Measuring Statistical Data in the Tor
Anonymity Network, in FC 2010 WORKSHOPS 203, 203–05 (R. Sion et al. eds., 2010);
Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 15; Tor: Overview, supra note 153.
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are not only dissidents criticizing oppressive governments or
persons avoiding government censorship,157 but also journalists
communicating with whistleblowers, and the U.S. Navy gathering
intelligence.158
As are any evasive technical solutions, tools for the evasion of
geolocation are also susceptible to detection, at least to some
degree.159 For instance, a Java applet in a webpage may lead to the
identification of a user‘s true IP address,160 and certain timingbased geolocation tools might be able to localize a user without the
tools ever detecting the user‘s true IP address.161 Providers of
geolocation tools are constantly searching for ways to eliminate
evasion and identify true IP addresses to determine the accurate
geographic locations of Internet users. As one might expect, this is
a constant race where it may take just a few weeks or months for
the creators of evasion techniques to respond to improvements in
geolocation tools and improve their techniques to further challenge
geolocation.162
It is important to note that while cybertravel tools offered by
various sources currently operate on the basis of IP addresses,

157

See Loesing et al., supra note 156, at 203. ―While the original goal of Tor was to
enhance privacy, recently Tor has become popular amongst users who wish to
circumvent national censorship systems, such as those in countries like Iran and China.‖
Id. at 204. ―[T]he statistics . . . indicate that Tor usage significantly increased from
Iranian IP space in June 2009 after the Iranian elections.‖ Id. at 206; see also Interview
with Andrew Lewman, supra note 155.
158
See Tor: Overview, supra note 153. For other ways to evade geolocation see
Edelman, supra note 9; Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 14.
159
―Another problem is that Internet anonymizers (intermediate web servers that
disguise the user‘s IP address) and remote Internet connections can, despite
countermeasures by geo-ID firms, still sometimes defeat the identification process.‖
GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 26, at 62.
160
See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 16; see also Hoeren, Geolokalisation,
supra note 126.
161
See Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 18. Tools also exist to ―fingerprint‖ a
device; however, unless one of the identifying features contains location information, the
fingerprinting does not localize the device.
162
Compare Muir & Van Oorschot, supra note 101, at 3, with information by the
founders of the Tor project at the Def Con 18 conference in 2010 in Las Vegas, Nevada.
See also Geographic Location/Privacy/geopriv, IETF, http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/geo
priv/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
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cybertravel will not disappear simply because methods of locating
Internet users other than methods based on IP addresses will be
employed. Indeed, in the future other methods of tracking Internet
users‘ geographical locations could replace the current geolocation
tools that use IP addresses; either newly emerging or already
existing means—for instance means based on the global
positioning system (―GPS‖)—could become the norm for
localizing Internet users.163 Switching to any other means will not
necessarily end cybertravel but will likely lead to the development
of new evasion tools that will permit cybertravel under new
conditions.164
IV. THE LEGAL STATUS OF CYBERTRAVEL
It seems inevitable that the more geolocation is used to limit
access to certain content on the Internet, the more users will
cybertravel to bypass geolocation and access restricted content.
Even in the absence of governmentally mandated use of
geolocation by website operators, geolocation is likely to become
widespread as website operators respond to the requirements of
territorially-defined regulation on the Internet with a greater use of
geolocation tools. The more emphasis that regulators place on
territorial regulation, and the more that geolocation tools become
the means of complying with that regulation, the more pressing it
will become for there to be a legal conceptualization of
cybertravel. This conceptualization will also be needed if in the
future the need for attribution of acts on the Internet to particular
devices leads to IP addresses or other location identifiers being
embedded in Internet-connected devices; particularly in such an

163
See Eric Goldman, Geolocation and A Bordered Cyberspace, TECH. & MKTG. L.
BLOG (Nov. 13, 2007), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2007/11/geolocation _and.
htm. On various methods of localizing devices see, for instance, Barnes et al., supra note
8, at 15–16.
164
Even if IP addresses are embedded in devices—and even if they are permanently
attached to particular persons (for instance, through implantation into the human body)—
cybertravel will not necessarily be excluded, because tools are likely to continue to be
developed that will allow users to bypass geolocation.

606

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 22:567

environment the desire for cybertravel will intensify.165 It is
therefore crucial and timely to determine whether cybertravel is a
legal activity under present legal regimes and whether there are
reasons for which cybertravel should be made or remain legal in
the future. This Part discusses the current legal status of
cybertravel and suggests how the law should treat cybertravel in
the future—if there is or should be a future for legal cybertravel. It
also reviews some technological and business solutions that may
complement the future legal framework for cybertravel.
A. Is Cybertravel Legal?
It is difficult to analyze all the legal aspects of cybertravel in
the abstract because cybertravel is used for a wide variety of
purposes, both legal and illegal, such as avoiding governmental
regulation, bypassing limitations imposed because of the
contractual obligations of website operators, or merely viewing
advertisements created for a location other than the one in which
the user sits.166 However, it seems safe to state that there is one
party involved in cybertravel that is unlikely to be exposed to
liability: the website operator, who employs geolocation tools to
make his website viewable only to users from certain countries,
states, regions or locations.167 In fact, if a website operator‘s
decision to limit access to his website is based on a law-related
purpose (rather than a business-related purpose), he will usually
employ geolocation tools to restrict access to his website from
certain countries precisely for the purpose of complying with his
legal obligations rather than avoiding them.168
There are two parties that might be concerned about potential
liability for their involvement in cybertravel and two acts in
cybertravel that might lead directly or indirectly to liability.169 The

165

The same can be said for future devices that might be implanted into the human
body, thereby allowing for identification of not only the device but also the particular
person.
166
See supra note 14 and accompanying text (commenting on the scope of this article).
167
See supra Part II discussing geolocation tools.
168
The Hong Kong Company mentioned in Part II.A would be one exception.
169
Such liability may be both civil and criminal. See infra Part IV.A.
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parties are the Internet user, who utilizes cybertravel tools to
access restricted content, and the cybertravel tool provider, who
facilitates cybertravel by offering and providing the cybertravel
tools.170 The two acts involved in cybertravel that may expose the
user and the provider to liability are the act of viewing or using
restricted content and the act of cybertravel itself as a method of
circumventing tools used to restrict access to content. Although
cybertravel providers might not view or use restricted content or
cybertravel themselves, their facilitation of acts by users might
subject the providers to liability.
This section discusses the various legal aspects of cybertravel.
It reviews the potential for liability for both the cybertraveling user
and the cybertravel provider while taking into account current law
in both the United States and other countries, with particular
emphasis on copyright law.
1. Liability of Cybertraveling Users
The initial problem in assessing potential cybertraveler liability
is the problem of localization of their acts. Localization may
determine not only the countries under whose laws a cybertraveler
may be liable, but also often which countries‘ courts have personal
jurisdiction over the cybertraveler. Regardless of whether a
cybertraveler‘s other acts establish general jurisdiction in a
country, cybertravel can generate specific jurisdiction over the user
that emanates from the acts of cybertravel itself.
There are two approaches to the localization of the acts of
cybertravel: the physical world approach and the cyberspace
approach. The physical world approach is straightforward:
anything that the user does is localized in the place of his physical
location. Under this approach, when a user sits at his Internetconnected device in Chile and cybertravels to Germany by
utilizing a German IP address, his acts are localized in Chile where
he is physically located. If cybertravel enables the user to copy,
without the copyright holder‘s authorization, content that is
protected by copyright in Chile, the cybertraveler will be liable for
170

See supra Part III discussing cybertravel tools.
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copyright infringement in Chile—even if the content is made
available on the website of a non-Chilean website operator and is
stored on a server located outside of Chile. If Chile permits its
courts to exercise personal jurisdiction based on tortious activity
committed in their jurisdiction, Chilean courts will have personal
jurisdiction over the user based on the user‘s acts in Chile.
The user in the example could also be liable for his actions in
Germany if Germany had adopted the cyberspace approach to
localization. The cyberspace approach follows the packets that
carry information on the Internet and localizes acts based on the
place or places in which the cybertraveler‘s physical acts (of typing
on a keyboard) cause technological effects. For example, imagine
that the user in Chile cybertravels to Germany to access
copyrighted content on a website run by a German website
operator that is protected by technological protection measures
against viewing by users connected from outside Germany. If
using cybertravel to bypass the measures and access the content
without the copyright holder‘s authorization is illegal under
German law,171 liability for the act would arise in Germany
because Germany is the place where the measures are breached
(causing technological effects) to access the servers that store the
content. Because Germany provides for the jurisdiction of German
courts in the place of the effects of a tortious act, German courts
have personal jurisdiction over the user in Chile based on the
effects of the user‘s acts in Germany.172
Of course difficulties arise if, using the example above, the
content on the website that permits access only to users connecting
from Germany is stored on servers that are located in another
country, such as the United States. In this scenario, the acts of

171
See infra Part IV.A for a discussion of the European approach to liability for
breaching technological protection measures.
172
Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 5(3), 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1; Case C-21/76,
Handelskwekerij G. J.Bier B.V. v. Mines de Potasse d‘Alsace S.A., 1976 E.C.R. 1735;
Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] Code of Civil Procedure, Sept. 12, 1950, Bundesgesetzblatt,
Teil I (BGBl. I) 3202, as amended, § 32 (Ger.); ANDREAS RUFF, VERTRIEBSRECHT IM
INTERNET 62 (2003).
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breaching the protection measures and accessing the content
without authorization would then technically occur in the United
States. While liability might arise under U.S. law, establishing
personal jurisdiction in the United States based on the acts may be
difficult unless information about the location of the servers was
available to the cybertraveler at the time of his acts and it can be
claimed that he purposefully directed his actions at the particular
forum where the servers were located. This is a general problem
of personal jurisdiction on the Internet when purposeful direction
of tortious acts is required and a user directs the acts at a specific
forum, but the forum is unknown to him at the time of his acts.173
Even when users‘ acts occur while the users are cybertraveling
to another country, the users may still be in breach of laws that
prohibit them from viewing certain content or engaging in certain
conduct in the country where they are physically located.174 For
instance, the online gambling laws of South Africa penalize not
only companies that provide illegal online gambling in the
jurisdiction of South Africa and Internet service providers who
allow users in South Africa to access illegal online gambling
websites, but the laws also hold liable users who gamble on such
websites.175 Therefore, if a user located in South Africa gambles
173

For a discussion of the problem of acts on the Internet that are clearly directed at
some forum but the identity of the forum is unknown to the user at the time of the act see
Marketa Trimble, Setting Foot on Enemy Ground: Cease-and-Desist Letters, DMCA
Notifications and Personal Jurisdiction in Declaratory Judgment Actions, 50 IDEA 777,
818–21 (2010) [hereinafter Trimble, Enemy Ground].
174
This article provides a few examples of such laws but does not cover all the legal
doctrines that may be invoked when a user cybertravels.
175
In South Africa all three actors—the gambling website operator, the Internet service
provider, and the end user—are liable for illegal online gambling. See On-line Gambling
Transactions Are Outlawed in South Africa, GAUTENG GAMBLING BD.,
http://www.ggb.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3:newsflash2&catid=3:newsflash (last visited Nov. 19, 2011). Compare this with the situation in the
United States, where the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 does not
apply to players who place bets. Gerd Alexander, The U.S. on Tilt: Why the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act Is A Bad Bet, 2008 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 6, 29
(2008); see also Federal Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2006); S. Rep. No. 588, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) (and its associated legislative history). Cf. also Strafgesetzbuch
[StGB] [Penal Code], May 15, 1871, Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 127, as amended, § 284–
85 (on unlawful operating of gambling and participating in unlawful gambling).
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on one of these websites, the user breaches South African law, and
the fact that the user cybertravels to another country to do the
gambling will probably not shield the user from liability under
South African law nor from the personal jurisdiction of the South
African courts.
What if the laws of the country of the user‘s physical location
permit the user‘s acts but the acts are contrary to the laws of the
country to which the user cybertravels? Will a user‘s cybertravel
to a country where access to particular content or certain activities
are prohibited lead to the user‘s liability in that country? While it
may seem implausible that a user would purposefully cybertravel
to a country to engage in an activity that is illegal under the laws of
that country, such scenarios are possible. For example, a user
might want to criticize the country‘s political leaders to an extent
that would be deemed illegal in that country and wish to appear as
though he were located in the country. In a particularly alarming
scenario, a user may cybertravel to a country inadvertently—by
being redirected randomly through an intermediate IP address in
that country or by being assigned a final IP address in that country
without the user‘s intent or knowledge.176 While the physical
approach to cybertravel would create no user liability in a country
to which the user had cybertraveled, the cyberspace approach
would result in user liability. However, the level of the interest of
a country to which the user had cybertraveled in extending its
prescriptive jurisdiction over a non-resident user or enforcing its
laws against a non-resident user will vary according to the
country‘s interest in regulating behavior by non-residents. For
example, a country might have a minimal interest in enforcing its
anti-online gambling laws against non-resident users, even if the
country‘s courts could find grounds for extending their personal
jurisdiction over non-resident users. A country might, however,
have a much greater interest in extending its prescriptive and
adjudicatory jurisdiction in a situation involving a restriction of
speech177 or attacks on computers located in the country.178

176
177

See supra note 137 (discussing ―accidental cybertravel‖).
See infra notes 315 and 316.
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a) Liability under Copyright Laws
Copyright law is a particularly pertinent area for review in the
context of cybertravel because geolocation tools are often used as a
means of compliance with copyright laws, which afford
territorially-limited rights, and which, despite their significant level
of international harmonization, still vary among countries.179
Although a website operator, for example, may secure a license for
particular content, the license may be restricted to one country or a
limited number of countries. Website operators (or any licensee)
may enter into licenses that are not worldwide for any number of
reasons. First, the licensee might not have the necessary resources
to pay for worldwide rights, and obtaining a license for a limited
market could be the licensee‘s only option. Or, the licensor may
decide not to license content in certain markets if the licensor plans
to launch a country-specific version of the same content and does
not want competition from foreign versions.180 Further, the
licensor may wish to implement a strategy for releasing the work
in different countries in various media at various times. It is also
possible that copyright in a particular work might not be held by
the same right-holder in all countries and as a result there might be
high transaction costs associated with locating all of the rightholders and negotiating licenses with all of them, and right-holders
in some countries might simply not agree to a license. Because of
the territorial limitations of licenses, website operators and other
licensees use geolocation tools to limit access to licensed content

178

See infra Part IV.A.1.b (discussing the applicability of anti-hacking laws to acts of
cybertravel).
179
Notwithstanding the great degree of international harmonization that has been
achieved through several international treaties on copyright, copyright law is still a matter
of national legislation and subject to national differences associated with certain
flexibilities that are embedded in the treaties, occasional non-compliance with the
treaties, and the fact that some issues of copyright law remain unaffected by international
treaties.
180
There are numerous examples of national versions of television shows that are made
inaccessible to users from other countries where local national versions are available.
Dancing with the Stars is an example. See Outside the U.K.?, BBC: STRICTLY COME
DANCING, http://www.bbc.co.uk/strictlycomedancing/about/#outside_the_uk (last visited
Apr. 12, 2012).
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to users located only in the countries for which they have secured a
license.181
A cybertraveler might be subject to liability if cybertravel is
interpreted as an act of circumvention of geolocation, and if
geolocation tools are considered tools that prevent access to or
certain uses of a copyrighted work. Protection against the
circumvention of tools that protect works from unauthorized acts
was introduced at the international level by the 1996 WIPO
Copyright Treaty182 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty183 (the ―WIPO Treaties‖), which in Articles 11 and 18
respectively require countries that are parties to the Treaties to
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal
remedies against the circumvention of effective
technological measures that are used by [rightholders] in connection with the exercise of their
rights . . . and that restrict acts . . . which are not
authorized by the [right-holders] concerned or
permitted by law.184
Provided that geolocation tools meet the required standard of
effectiveness,185 and cybertravel is viewed as a circumvention tool,
181
It is important to note that without a partitioning of the Internet some licensees
would not be in business if a worldwide license was required for content that they wanted
to use on the Internet.
182
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996,
S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997). The Treaty was signed by the United
States in 1997, ratified by the United States in 1999, and entered into force for the United
States in 2002. Treaties and Contracting Parties, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/
en/Remarks.jsp?cnty_id=1085C (last visited Feb. 8, 2012). The Treaty was implemented
by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which was adopted in 1998. Digital Millenium
Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 28–60 (1998).
183
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Performances and Phonograms
Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
184
World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20,
1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997); World Intellectual Property
Organization [WIPO] Performances and Phonograms Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997). For examples of technological protection
measures see Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and
Europe, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 323, 325–31 (2004).
185
It is unlikely that the fact that it is ―fantastically easy‖ to evade geolocation tools,
Laurie supra note 132, at 12, would impact their ―effectiveness‖ for purposes of the anti-
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the question becomes, at least under the language of the WIPO
Treaties, whether the use of geolocation tools—the filtering of
access based on a user‘s location—is used to restrict unauthorized
or illegal acts.186
In line with the language of the WIPO Treaties, European laws
that have implemented the WIPO Treaties and the corresponding

circumvention provisions. In the United States, technological protection measures have
to be measures that, ―in the ordinary course of [their] operation, require the application of
information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to
gain access to work.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (2006). In 321 Studios v. Metro
Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2004), the court rejected
the argument that a technological measure cannot be considered effective if its
countermeasures are ―widely available on the Internet.‖ Id. at 1095. The court noted that
the argument would be ―equivalent to a claim that, since it is easy to find skeleton keys
on the black market, a deadbolt is not an effective lock to a door.‖ Id. See also Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that
the effectiveness of a technological measure does not depend on ―whether or not it is a
strong means of protection.‖).
In the United Kingdom Lord Justice Jacob commented on the term ―effective
technological measures‖ in a 2008 decision: ―It is an odd phrase to use in English—in its
context it clearly refers to something which is intended to have an effect rather than
something which is invariably successful. If it meant the latter, then there would be no
need to have a law preventing circumvention.‖ Neil Stanley Higgs v. The Queen, [2008]
EWCA (Crim) 1324, [27] (Eng.). In the United Kingdom a measure is considered
―effective‖ if it ―achieves the intended protection‖ by providing the copyright owner
control of the use of the work ―through . . . an access control or protection process . . .
[or] a copy control mechanism.‖ Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §
296ZF(2).
In Germany, geolocation tools that allow the restriction of access to users from
certain countries would probably qualify under the definition of an effective technological
measure as ―an access control.‖ Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte
[UrhG] [German Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 3044,
as amended, § 95a(2) (Ger.).
As the Oberlandesgericht München pointed out, the ineffectiveness of a
technological protection measure cannot be concluded from the existence of a
circumvention tool; ―it is more determinative for the effectiveness of the protection
measures whether they prevent an average user from infringing copyright.‖
Oberlandesgericht München I [OLG I] [Higher Regional Court] Nov. 14, 2007, BECKONLINE DATENBANK [BECKRS] 23466 (Ger.). For a commentary on the issue of
effectiveness from the EU perspective see Stefan Bechtold, A Commentary on the 2001
EU Information Society Directive, in CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 343, 387–88
(Thomas Dreier, P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
186
For a discussion of the problem from the Australian perspective see Svantesson, Cat
and Mouse, supra note 117, at 27–28.
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provision of the 2001 EU Information Society Directive187 require
that circumvention of technological measures be associated with a
committed or potential unauthorized or illegal act.188 For instance,
a U.K. law provides protection for technological measures only to
the extent that the measures aim at ―prevent[ing] or
restrict[ing] . . . acts that are not authorised by the copyright owner
. . . and are restricted by copyright.‖189 Since authorization is
necessary only for acts that would infringe copyright if committed
without authorization,190 measures preventing a user from
accessing a work for reasons other than to prevent acts of
copyright infringement will not enjoy the protection that the law
187
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society, art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter 2001 EU Information
Society Directive].
188
Martin Senftleben, a commentary on the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, in CONCISE
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 87, 111–12 (Thomas Dreier & Brent Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
The requirement of a connection with the exercise of [the WIPO
Copyright Treaty] or Berne rights reflects the principle expressed at
the 1996 Diplomatic Conference that the protection of technological
measures should complement the grant of exclusive rights so as to
allow their effective enforcement in the digital environment.
Accordingly, the international obligation to protect the right holder
against acts of circumvention does not arise if the use of
technological measures goes beyond the scope of the rights granted in
the [WIPO Copyright Treaty] or the [Berne Convention].
Id.
It is debatable whether the same requirement of a link between the protection of
technological measures and the protection of the rights granted by copyright applies in
the EU to the protection of computer programs against ―any act of putting into
circulation, or the possession for commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended
purpose of which is to facilitate . . . circumvention of any technical device which may
have been applied to protect a computer program.‖ Directive 2009/24/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of
computer programs, art. 7(1)(c), 2009 O.J. (L 111) 16.
189
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZF(3). The provision that
applies to a person circumventing a technological measure ―applied to a copyright work
other than a computer program‖ is § 296ZA.
190
―When speaking of ‗acts which are not authorised‘ it is implicit that one is
considering only acts which need authorisation, i.e. acts which are otherwise restricted.
To ‗authorise‘ a man to do something he is free to do anyway–something which needs no
authority–is a meaningless concept.‖ Lord Justice Jacob in Neil Stanley Higgs v. The
Queen, [2008] EWCA (Crim) 1324, [32] (Eng.).
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provides for technological protection measures.191 Similarly, the
German Copyright Act limits the protection provided to
technological measures by defining them as measures that are
―designed to prevent or restrict‖ unauthorized acts.192 Therefore,
the question of liability for circumvention of geolocation under the
copyright laws of these countries depends on whether the
cybertraveling user engages or may engage in an act of copyright
infringement.193
Based on the territoriality principle that governs copyright
laws, it would appear logical for acts of circumvention to be illegal
under the laws that protect copyrighted works only if the acts are
connected to the infringement of copyright under the law of the
same country.194 For example, if the associated act of direct

191

However, for a discussion on copyright infringements that occur in the United
Kingdom when temporary copies are created, see infra notes 220–21 and accompanying
text.
192
Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [UrhG] [German Copyright
Act], Sept. 9, 1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] 3044, as amended, § 108b(1)
(Ger.); Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May
2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the
information society, art. 6(3), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17, available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2001:167:0010:0019:EN:PDF.
193
In a 2010 decision the German Supreme Court confirmed that technological
measures are also protected by German law when they are designed to protect the right to
make a work available to the public under §19a of the German Copyright Act. The right
would probably not be interpreted to include the right of access by an individual user. See
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 29, 2010, MEDIEN, INTERNET
UND RECHT [MIR] 159, 2010 (Ger.). For safeguards against technological measures that
prevent uses allowed by copyright law see infra note 205. See also Australian Copyright
Act 1968 (Cth) § 10(1), available at http://www.adelaide.edu.au/legals/docs/copyright
1968.pdf (―[C]ircumvention service means a service, the performance of which has only a
limited commercially significant purpose, or no such purpose or use, other than the
circumvention, or facilitating the circumvention, of an [sic] technological protection
measure.‖); Svantesson, Cat and Mouse, supra note 117, at 26–27 (discussing the
technological protection measure provision of the Act).
194
Theoretically, country A could impose liability under its copyright law even for a
circumvention in country A of technological measures that was connected to an act of
copyright infringement in country B. Courts in country A would then have to assess
whether copyright was infringed under B‘s law. Courts in country A would determine
liability for the acts of circumvention as long as A‘s courts considered copyright
infringement actions to be transitory causes of action (meaning that infringements under
B‘s copyright law would be justiciable in A‘s courts) or were willing to assess
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copyright infringement is reproduction of the copyrighted work,
the act of circumvention, if it can be tied to the direct infringement,
can be infringing only where the act of reproduction occurred.
Therefore, if a cybertraveler travels from Chile to Germany, and
the only copyright infringing act that he commits is reproducing
the accessed works on his computer in Chile (if the act is
considered copyright infringing under Chilean law), it will be the
Chilean anti-circumvention law that will apply; the German anticircumvention provision will not apply if there is no associated act
of copyright infringement that could be localized in Germany.195
The territorial limitations will not apply if a country‘s anticircumvention provisions do not protect copyrighted works from
access only for copyright infringing purposes but also for
copyright non-infringing purposes. If the provisions are drafted to
impose direct liability for any circumvention of measures that
prevent access to the works—whether or not the circumvention
occurs for the purpose of infringing copyright—no related act of
copyright infringement in the same country will be necessary to
find the user liable under the anti-circumvention provisions.
Therefore, if country B has such anti-circumvention provisions, a
user who cybertravels from country A to country B, or who
cybertravels through servers located in country B on the way from
country A to country C, may be liable in country B under the anticircumvention provisions of country B even if while cybertraveling
the user does not infringe copyright under the laws of country B.
In the United States, the federal circuits disagree on whether all
of the provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(―DMCA‖) that protect technological measures196 require a
showing of nexus between the circumvention and the copyright

infringement under B‘s copyright law as an ancillary question. It appears unlikely that
countries would be willing to extend their protection to foreign copyright laws, but if
countries were willing to extend their protection to foreign copyright laws, a protective
mechanism against enforcement of copyright laws that included policies contrary to A‘s
policies could be drafted into A‘s anti-circumvention laws.
195
See supra notes 192–93 and accompanying text.
196
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
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infringement.197 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
requires a plaintiff who complains of circumvention of its
technological protection measures ―to demonstrate that the
circumventing technology infringes or facilitates infringement of
the plaintiff‘s copyright.‖198 This requirement means that the
Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA is consistent with the European approach
because it limits liability under the provision to acts that result in
copyright infringement;199 other acts of circumvention that are not
connected with existing or potential infringement are permitted.200
In the cybertravel context this interpretation means that
cybertravel, whether into the United States or from the United
States, results in no liability under the DMCA unless there is an
associated act of direct infringement that can be localized in the
United States.201

197

However, this circuit split may be irrelevant in practice because of the courts‘
approach to temporary copying and the possibility of rendering such copying as copyright
infringing through a simple contractual provision. See infra note 224 and accompanying
text.
198
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm‘t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 948 (9th Cir. 2010)
(citing Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2004)). The Chamberlain court ―conclude[d] that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only forms
of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act
otherwise affords copyright owners. . . . [I]t is the only meaningful reading of the
statute.‖ Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1202–03 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); see also Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng‘g & Consulting, Inc.,
421 F.3d 1307, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (―A court must look at the threat that the
unauthorized circumvention potentially poses in each case to determine if there is a
connection between the circumvention and a right protected by the Copyright Act.‖)
(citation omitted).
199
Cf. Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 390–92 (on options that EU member countries
have when implementing provisions on protection of technological measures).
200
See Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1204 (―A copyright owner seeking to impose liability
on an accused circumventor must demonstrate a reasonable relationship between the
circumvention at issue and a use relating to a property right for which the Copyright Act
permits the copyright owner to withhold authorization—as well as notice that
authorization was withheld.‖). See also Storage Tech. Corp., 421 F.3d at 1318–19
(finding an insufficient nexus between the circumvention measure and rights protected by
copyright law).
201
See infra note 276 on ―dual use‖ technologies.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagrees with
the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of the anti-circumvention
provisions of the DMCA.202 The Ninth Circuit maintains, as does
the Second Circuit,203 that while section 1201(b) of the Copyright
Act is bound to an act of copyright infringement, section 1201(a)
creates liability for circumvention per se,204 which means that an
unauthorized act of circumvention leads to liability even if it is
undertaken for purposes that are not copyright infringing.205 The
Ninth Circuit‘s interpretation therefore recognizes section 1201(a)

202

MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 950.
See infra note 208.
204
Circumvention is illegal if it concerns any ―technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work.‖ 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
205
Among the arguments that the Ninth Circuit listed in support of its interpretation of
section 1201(a) as prohibiting acts of circumvention of any measures controlling access
to copyrighted work is the fact that section 1201(a) authorizes the Librarian of Congress
to determine when circumvention for certain ―noninfringing uses‖ of selected
copyrighted works will be exempted from the provision. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(D)
(2006); MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 951. The existence of the authorization to provide for
exemptions suggests that absent an exemption, circumvention for ―noninfringing uses‖
will result in liability under section 1201(a). Indeed, among the exemptions that the
Librarian of Congress issued in July 2010 are examples of circumvention used to achieve
what appear to be fair uses, such as circumvention of DVD Content Scrambling System
to extract ―short portions of motion pictures into new works for the purpose of criticism
or comment . . . [for] educational uses by college and university professors.‖ Libr. Of
Cong., Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. 43825, 43827 (July 27, 2010) (codified at 37
C.F.R. § 201.40). However, similar fair-use-sounding uses appear among the ―classes
considered, but not recommended,‖ id. at 43834, for which no exemption was issued. See
37 C.F.R. § 201.40 (2010). For instance, one of the classes that was not exempted in
2010 was ―subscription based services that offer DRM-protected streaming video where
the provider has only made available players for a limited number of platforms.‖
Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Access
Control Technologies, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43834. In this case, the Librarian denied an
exemption that would have allowed users to watch the video on other platforms, because
alternative devices already exist (such as DVD players) that a user interested in a noninfringing use can utilize. Id. at 43835. Compare this with Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 296ZE (detailing the complaint procedure and remedies
available ―where effective technological measures prevent permitted acts‖). For other
approaches that EU countries have adopted for the same problem of remedying protection
by technological measures that affect copyright non-infringing uses see Bechtold, supra
note 185, at 343, 392.
203
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as creating a new ―right to permit access to copyrighted work,‖206 a
right that is not among the exclusive rights that copyright holders
traditionally enjoy207 and that is not—as opposed to the exclusive
rights enumerated in section 106 of the Copyright Act—subject to
the fair use doctrine.208
If the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts‘ interpretation of
section 1201(a) prevails, cybertravel could expose a user to
liability for the act of circumventing an access control, regardless
of what use—copyright infringing or not—might follow, as long as
there is access to a copyrighted work involved in the particular act
of cybertravel and the court determines that geolocation tools are
―effectively control[ling] access to a [copyrighted] work.‖209 This
interpretation has far-reaching consequences for cybertravel. Not
only would the application of section 1201(a) result in liability for
anyone cybertraveling from the United States, whether or not for
copyright infringing purposes, but it would also lead to liability for
anyone who cybertravels into the United States, regardless of
purpose, or anyone who, through cybertravel to another country,
accesses a website stored on a server in the United States,
regardless of purpose. In any of these cases, under the Ninth and
Second Circuit‘s interpretation, a breach of section 1201(a) would
206

It could also be called the right to prevent digital trespass.
On the relevant legislative history see MDY Indus., 629 F.3d at 946 (―Congress
created a new anticircumvention right in § 1201(a)(2) independent of traditional
copyright infringement and granted copyright owners a new weapon against copyright
infringement in § 1201(b)(1).‖); id. at 948 (―[S]ection (a) creates a new
anticircumvention right distinct from copyright infringement, while section (b)
strengthens the traditional prohibition against copyright infringement.‖). See also
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 2001) (identifying the
distinction between sections (a) and (b)).
208
See 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006). See also Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 443
(rejecting the argument that circumvention of encryption technology protecting
copyrighted material should be exempt[ed] from copyright liability ―when the material
will be put to ‗fair uses.‘‖). In the same case the appellants unsuccessfully attempted to
present a constitutional argument. Id. at 444–45. See also Gideon Parchomovsky & Philip
J. Weiser, Beyond Fair Use, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 91, 103–04 (2010) (discussing the
Universal City Studios case); id. at 93 (arguing that, ―[t]he golden era of fair use—if one
ever existed—ended . . . with the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act‖).
209
17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(3)(B) (2006). For a discussion of the requirement of
―effectiveness‖ of technological measures see supra note 185.
207
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occur because the use of the cybertravel tools would occur in the
United States.210
The only way to remove any cybertravel to, from, or through
the United States from the application of the DMCA as interpreted
by the Ninth and Second Circuit Courts would be to achieve an
exemption from the Librarian of Congress from the scope of the
anti-circumvention provision;211 whether such an exemption is
possible depends, inter alia, on whether the cybertravel is being
employed for copyright non-infringing purposes.212 Whether the
acts in which the user engages through cybertravel are infringing
or non-infringing is decisive if the interpretation by the Federal
Circuit is adopted, and an analysis of the user‘s possible direct
copyright infringement liability under potentially applicable
foreign laws is essential in determining whether the user who
travels into or through the United States may also be directly liable
for circumvention of technological protection measures in the
foreign country of direct infringement.
The viewing of a copyrighted work does not per se infringe
copyright. Once a work is made available to the public any user is
free to view a work even without the copyright holder‘s
authorization unless a ―right to permit access to [the] copyrighted
work‖ exists, which may be the case under the interpretation by the
Ninth and Second Circuits of section 1201(a) of the Copyright Act.
However, reproducing a work without authorization may be an act
of copyright infringement, and therefore if a cybertraveler (or any
Internet user, for that matter) deliberately makes a copy of a work,
absent a valid defense or copyright exception, the cybertraveler
will be liable for copyright infringement.213 The problem is that
210

For a discussion of such a scenario, see supra note 194 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the exemption process, see supra note 205.
212
17 U.S.C. §1201(a)(1)(D) (2006).
213
Here some significant differences exist between the United States and the rest of the
world because outside the United States users do not enjoy as many limitations on the
rights conferred by copyright as users in the United States enjoy under the U.S. fair use
doctrine. Generally, other countries rely on a limited number of enumerated exceptions
to copyright. See, e.g., Amélie Blocman, Court of Cassation Pronounces on Private
Copying Versus Technical Protective Devices, IRIS Merlin 2006-4:12/20, available at
http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2006/4/article20.en.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2011)
211
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even if the user only intends to view the work without creating a
copy, a copy is created anyway—automatically, by the user‘s
computer memory in the process of displaying the work. The
question then becomes whether this copying in a computer‘s
temporary memory, which occurs outside a user‘s control,214 is an
infringing reproduction as defined by copyright law,215 and if so,
whether it falls within one of the exceptions to copyright, or is
subject to the fair use doctrine.216
Existing court decisions suggest that the status of temporary
copies will depend, inter alia, on the associated acts by the user.217
As long as the temporary copies are made in the course of a lawful
use of the work they will likely be non-infringing; however, if they
are created as a part of an unlawful use, they may be held
infringing. In the United States, the Ninth Circuit in Perfect 10,
Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.218 explained that the creation of
temporary copies on a user‘s computer may constitute fair use in a
particular situation, but the court indicated that not every
temporary copy will be fair use.219 U.K. courts have declared
(discussing a case involving circumvention of technological protection measures for
purposes of creating a private copy).
214
See, e.g., Jesse S. Bennett, Caching In On the Google Books Library Project: A
Novel Approach to the Fair Use Defense and the DMCA Caching Safe Harbors, 35 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1003, 1007–22 (2008) (discussing temporary, transient, and cache copies).
215
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir.
2008) (on buffer data as not being copies under the U.S. Copyright Act); Ticketmaster
L.L.C. v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1105–06 (C.D. Ca. 2007) (on cache
copies as copies under the U.S. Copyright Act).
216
See generally Aaron Perzanowski, Fixing RAM Copies, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1067
(2010) (discussing the development of the legal status of RAM copies). On temporary
copies and streaming see generally Frank A. Koch, Der Content bleibt im Netz –
gesicherte Werkverwertung durch Streaming-Verfahren, 7 GRUR 574 (2010); Borghi,
supra note 24 (exploring the copyright implications of the use of on-demand and live
streaming technologies in the context of European case law).
217
There are several issues involved in decisions on temporary copies; a detailed
analysis of all of the issues is beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 14 and
accompanying text (generally commenting on the scope of this article).
218
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1169 (9th Cir. 2007).
219
Id. at 1169.
[E]ven assuming such automatic copying could constitute direct
infringement, it is a fair use in this context. The copying function
performed automatically by a user‘s computer to assist in accessing
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automatically-created temporary copies to be infringing when the
copies resulted from playing counterfeit video games;220 these
copies could not benefit from the explicit exception from copyright
protection that temporary copies enjoy under the U.K. law because
the exception applies only if such copies are created to enable ―a
lawful use of the work‖ with ―no independent economic
significance.‖221
The ―lawfulness‖ of the use of a copyrighted work does not
depend only on the status of the acts under copyright law; the use
of a work will be ―unlawful‖ even if it is contrary only to a
provision in a user agreement.222 Therefore, for instance, if a user
agreement limits possible uses to non-commercial purposes, using
the work for commercial purposes will be unlawful, and any
temporary copying associated with the commercial purposes may
the Internet is a transformative use. Moreover, . . . a cache copies no
more than is necessary to assist the user in Internet use. It is designed
to enhance an individual‘s computer use, not to supersede the
copyright holders‘ exploitation of their works.
Id. (emphasis added).
Compare Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F .Supp. 2d 1096, 1109–10
(C.D. Cal. 2007) (discussing the status of cache copies), with Cartoon Network LP, LLLP
v. CSC Holding, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008). In Cartoon Network, the Second
Circuit distinguished between buffer data and ―data . . . embodied in the computer‘s
RAM memory until the user turned the computer off.‖ Id. at 130. The Court held that
buffer data did not fulfill the fixation or embodiment requirement under copyright law,
specifically the duration requirement. Id. at 127, 130.
220
Sony Comp. Entm‘t v. Ball, [2004] EWHC (Ch) 1738, 6 [15], (Eng.); R v. Higgs,
[2008] EWCA (Crim) 1324 (Eng.); R v. Gilham, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2293 [25] (Eng.)
(―[E]ven if the contents of the RAM of a game console at any one time is not a
substantial copy, the image displayed on screen is such.‖).
221
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 28A(b) (Eng.). The second
exception is made to enable ―a transmission of the work in a network between third
parties by an intermediary.‖ Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 28A(a)
(Eng.); see also Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 17(6) (Eng.)
(explaining that infringing ―copying in relation to any description of work includes the
making of copies which are transient or are incidental to some other use of the work‖).
On the situation under German law see Koch, supra note 216; Thomas Busch, Zur
urheberrechtlichen Einordnung der Nutzung von Streamingangeboten, 6 GRUR 496,
501–03 (2011).
222
However, under the WIPO Copyright Treaty countries are not required to protect
technological measures designed to protect a work beyond the protection afforded by
copyright. See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 184, at art. 11.
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be considered infringing.223 The fact that an appropriately worded
user agreement may render temporary copies infringing224 means
in practice that the difference in the approaches to § 1201(a) taken
by the Federal Circuit and the Ninth and Second Circuits might be
marginal: the terms of the user agreement could cause courts to
view the creation of any temporary copies as a violation of the user
agreement, and the user could be subject to liability under
§ 1201(a) for an act of circumvention associated with the creation
of such copies even under the Federal Circuit‘s ―European-style‖
interpretation.
Whether a user breached a user agreement will affect a user‘s
liability for circumvention only when the user cybertravels from
the United States; it will have no effect on a user‘s liability if the
user cybertravels into the United States. The user cybertraveling
from Chile to the United States to access a copyrighted work will
be liable under the Ninth and Second Circuits‘ interpretation of §
223

This conclusion appears to be confirmed by the decision in Newspaper Licensing
Agency Ltd. v. Meltwater Holding BV, [2010] EWHC (Ch) 3099 (Eng.).
[T]he temporary copies exception is solely concerned with incidental
and intermediate copying so that any copy which is ‗consumption of
the work‘, whether temporary or not, requires the permission of the
copyright holder. A person making a copy of a webpage on his
computer screen will not have a defence under s. 28A CDPA simply
because he has been browsing. He must first show that it was lawful
for him to have made the copy. The copy is not part of the
technological process; it is generated by his own volition. The whole
point of the receipt and copying of Meltwater News is to enable the
End User to receive and read it. Making the copy is not an essential
and integral part of a technological process but the end which the
process is designed to achieve.
Id. at [109].
The exception cannot have been intended to legitimise all copies
made in the course of browsing or users would be permitted to watch
pirated films and listen to pirated music. The kind of circumstance
where the defence may be available is where the purpose of the
copying is to enable efficient transmission in a network between third
parties by an intermediary, typically an internet service provider.
Id. at [110]; see also Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors v. Meltwater Holding BV
& Ors, [2011] EWCA Civ 890 (Eng.), at [30]-[35].
224
See, e.g., Ticketmaster, LLC v. RMG Tech., Inc., 507 F .Supp. 2d 1096, 1110 (C.D.
Cal. 2007) (finding cache copying was not fair use if it occurred while the defendant
violated the Terms of Use).
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1201(a), regardless of whether or not he accessed the content in
breach of a user agreement, because the Ninth and Second Circuits
do not require a related act of copyright infringement in the United
States to accompany the circumvention of technological measures.
The existence or non-existence of a user agreement will also have
no effect on the result of the assessment of the user‘s liability
under the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation in a scenario in which the
user cybertravels into the United States, but with the opposite
result: the user should not be liable in the United States under §
1201(a) of the DMCA because the temporary copy created by the
user‘s computer in Chile does not infringe U.S. copyright law
(though it may infringe Chilean law if Chilean law considers
infringing the creation of temporary copies that result from an
unlawful use of a work). The only scenario in which a breach of a
user agreement will make a difference is when a user cybertravels
from the United States and the Federal Circuit‘s interpretation of §
1201(a) of the DMCA is operative: without a user agreement the
user‘s cybertravel for purposes that do not infringe copyright will
be legal because the temporary copies on his computer will not
violate a user agreement, but under a user agreement that renders
temporary copies copyright infringing, cybertravel will be
illegal.225
b) Liability under Other Laws
User agreements may not only generate or solidify right holder
protection under copyright law provisions on protection of
technological measures, but the agreements, if breached, may also
expose end users to contractual liability.226 To limit cybertravel
directly under contract, content providers may prohibit users from
changing the information that identifies their physical location.
225
Under the Ninth and Second Circuit‘s interpretation of section 1201(a) the breach of
a user agreement will not matter, whether a user cybertravels from or into the United
States: all cybertravel will violate the anti-circumvention provisions of section 1201(a).
226
―Contract law has rapidly become a regular companion to copyright protection as
the structure of the Internet enables the formation of contract relationships between
information producers and end users, either directly or through intermediaries.‖ PAUL
GOLDSTEIN & P. BERNT HUGENHOLTZ, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW,
AND PRACTICE 334 (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2010).
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For instance, the German television station SAT1 in its user
agreement includes a provision against circumvention of the
geographical limitations that SAT1 imposes on access to
audiovisual content on its website.227 According to the agreement,
the user must ―use the retrieved content only within the use areas
permitted by [the media company], and may not in particular alter,
circumvent or otherwise disregard technical measures applied by
[the media company] to territorially limit the use.‖228
Consequently, users cybertraveling from unpermitted areas breach
the contract and are exposed to direct liability through the
contractual provisions; the applicable law in user agreements like
that of SAT1 will often be set in the contract, or may depend on
choice-of-law provisions in the country where the cybertraveler is
sued.
Because cybertravel entails remote access to content stored on
a computer or a storage facility,229 the question arises as to whether
cybertravel can expose users to liability under anti-hacking laws,
and not only to civil but also to criminal liability. Anti-hacking
provisions such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the
United States230 target acts of access to a computer without
authorization,231 and such acts include not only physical access but

227

Nutzungsbedingungen für die Nutzung des Videoportals von Sat.1 [Terms and
Conditions for Use of the Sat.1 Video Portal], SAT.1, http://www.sat1.de/service/
nutzungsbedingungen/nutzungsbedingungen-fuer-die-nutzung-des-videoportals-von-sat-1
(last visited Nov. 11, 2011) (Ger.).
228
Id. § 4.1(g) (English translation).
229
Data storage facilities are included in the definition of a ―computer‖ in the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1) (2008); see also, Council Framework
Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, art.
1(a), 2005 O.J. (L 69) 48 (EU); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 17(6) (Eng.). The
definition is likely to expand to encompass a greater number of devices; for instance,
recently the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit confirmed that a cellular phone
is a ―computer‖ under the provision. See United States v. Kramer, 631 F.3d 900, 901 (8th
Cir. 2011). For a discussion of ―access,‖ see Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 17(2)
(Eng.).
230
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
231
E.g., id. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (―Whoever . . . intentionally accesses a computer without
authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . . information from any
protected computer . . . .‖); see also Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of 24
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also remote access through a network.232 However, there could be
limitations on the liability of a cybertraveler under anti-hacking
provisions; for instance, under U.S. law a cybertraveler‘s acts
might not result in the kind of ―damage‖233 or ―loss‖234 that would
warrant a civil action against the cybertraveler.235 Perhaps the
website operator could avoid this limitation by permitting access to
restricted content only for a fee;236 cybertraveling to the United
States to avoid the fee would then bring the cybertraveler within
February 2005 on attacks against information systems, art. 2(1), 2005 O.J. (L 69) 48
(EU); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, §§ 1(1), 17(5), 17(8) (Eng.).
232
18 U.S.C. § 1030(a); see also, Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,
Budapest, November 23, 2001, ch. 2 § 1 art. 2, available at http://conventions.coe.int
/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/185.htm; Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra
note 231, art. 1(d); Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 1(1) (Eng.).
233
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act defines ―damage‖ as ―any impairment to the
integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information.‖ 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(8). For a discussion of the terms ―damage‖ and ―loss‖ under the Act see, e.g.,
Multiven, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., 725 F. Supp. 2d 887, 894–95 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
234
According to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
―loss‖ means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of
responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and
restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition
prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.
18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(11).
235
Id. § 1030(g).
Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of
this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.
A civil action for a violation of this section may be brought only if
the conduct involves 1 of the factors set forth in subclauses (I), (II),
(III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i) . . . .
Id. The only potentially relevant factor would be
loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, for purposes
of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the
United States only, loss resulting from a related course of conduct
affecting 1 or more other protected computers) aggregating at least
$5,000 in value . . . .
Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I); see also EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA, supra
note 231, at art. 2(1) (allowing EU member states not to criminalize certain acts of
accessing information systems in cases that are considered ―minor‖).
236
This solution addresses only the issue of the magnitude of the loss; it does not
address the potential problem of the nature of the loss as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
1030(e)(11).
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the scope of the Act.237 Although making access from abroad
contingent upon the payment of a fee might be a straightforward
and simple solution to implement technically, it might not always
be possible; in many cases website operators employ geolocation
tools because they either do not have rights to make the content
available to users from certain countries or they do not want to be
regulated by the laws of those countries.238
Although allowing access from countries from which access is
restricted, even for a fee, might not always be an option, one
business implementation on the horizon may test this arrangement.
The BBC announced in November 2010 its plan to offer to users
connecting to its website from outside the United Kingdom some
of the content that it currently makes available only to users
connecting from inside the United Kingdom.239 Making access
from abroad contingent upon the payment of a fee while
maintaining free access for users connecting from inside the
United Kingdom could result in liability not only for users who
cybertravel to avoid payment of the fee but also for those who
facilitate the cybertravel to the United Kingdom by providing the
tools that enable the cybertravel. Apart from making applicable
various legal doctrines to prevent unwanted cybertravel, such a
pay-per-foreign-view system will compete with the services of
mainstream cybertravel providers who charge for their tools that
are designed to accomplish the same result—the viewing of the
restricted foreign content. The next section analyzes the question
of liability of cybertravel providers, whether or not those using
their tools circumvent a fee when cybertraveling.

237

See infra note 246 and accompanying text for a further discussion of how making
content available for a fee might bring a cybertravel provider within the scope of not only
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the United States but also national provisions
implementing the 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive.
238
See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the reasons for using geolocation tools to
limit access to content.
239
Jonathan Wynne-Jones, BBC Aims to Gain from Global iPlayer, TELEGRAPH (Nov.
7,
2010),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/mediatechnologyand
telecoms/digital-media/8114911/BBC-aims-to-gain-from-global-iPlayer.html.
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2. Liability of Cybertravel Providers
Although individual cybertravelers may be subject to direct
liability in either the country where they are physically located or
the country to which they cybertravel, they might not be the best
targets for enforcement actions; as has been shown in the relatively
short history of the Internet, the most valuable enforcement targets
are often intermediaries. Enforcement actions against individual
Internet users can be highly inefficient, and the costs of detection
and enforcement will often be excessive when compared to any
benefits that might be achieved through such enforcement—both in
terms of recourse against individual users and the deterrence of
other users;240 enforcement against intermediaries is likely to yield
better results. In the case of cybertravel these intermediaries are
the providers of cybertravel tools.
Cybertravel providers should be concerned about the
secondary liability they might face in connection with end users
who use their cybertravel tools for direct infringement;241 however,
providers might also need to be concerned about exposing
themselves to direct liability. For example, in the case of South
Africa, it is possible that cybertravel providers could be held liable
as ―persons, entities or organisations which facilitate the provision
of [illegal] on-line gambling.‖242 Cybertravel providers could also
face direct liability under copyright law provisions that protect
technological measures; national implementing provisions
concerning the measures cover acts of manufacturing, importation,
offering to the public, providing, and otherwise trafficking in
technologies for circumventing technological measures.243 For
providers to be liable, some nexus will generally be required
between the acts of facilitated circumvention and potential or
240

For a discussion of the problem of ―asserting control at the source‖ see Zittrain,
supra note 116, at 207–09. See also Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 330–31.
241
See infra for a discussion of the potential indirect liability of cybertravel providers.
242
On-line Gambling Transactions Are Outlawed in South Africa, GAUTENG GAMBLING
BD., http://www.ggb.org.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3:
newsflash-2&catid=3:newsflash (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
243
E.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2006). While the Federal Circuit Court views
these DMCA provisions as codifying forms of secondary liability, the provisions are
drafted to create direct liability.
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existing copyright infringement.244 However, in the United States
no nexus is required if the Ninth and Second Circuits‘
interpretation of section 1201(a) applies, and cybertravel providers
may be liable for providing circumvention tools even without a
nexus.245
Cybertravel providers face another problem if their tools allow
users to bypass the payment of a fee for access. As explained
earlier,246 website operators can decide to provide content for free
in countries where access is not restricted but charge a pay-perforeign-view fee to users accessing the same programming from
other countries. If cybertravel providers facilitate user access to
websites without the payment of a required fee, the providers could
be exposed in the United States to liability under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act,247 and similarly, in the EU, the providers
could be liable under national provisions implementing the 1998
EU Conditional Access Directive,248 which protects services that
limit access in order to collect remuneration249 from ―illicit devices
which allow access to these services free of charge.‖250 Infringing
activities under the Directive include the manufacture, import,
distribution, sale, rental, possession, installation, maintenance,
244

It is debatable whether the same nexus is required in the EU for the protection of
computer programs against ―any act of putting into circulation, or the possession for
commercial purposes of, any means the sole intended purpose of which is to facilitate . . .
circumvention of any technical device which may have been applied to protect a
computer program.‖ Council Directive 2009/24/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 23 April 2009 on the legal protection of computer programs, art. 7(1)(c),
2009 O.J. (L 111) 52.
245
See supra Part IV.A.1.a (discussing the circuit split).
246
See id.
247
See supra text accompanying notes 230–35; see also 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6)(A)
(2008).
248
Directive 98/84 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November
1998 on the legal protection of services based on, or consisting of, conditional access,
1998 O.J. (L 320) 54 [hereinafter 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive]; see also
European Convention on the Legal Protection of Services Based on, or Consisting of,
Conditional Access, COUNCIL OF EUROPE (Jan. 24, 2001), http://conventions.coe.int
/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/178.htm.
249
1998 EU Conditional Access Directive, supra note 248, at recitals 3, 6.
250
Compare 1998 EU Conditional Access Directive, supra note 248, at recital 6 and 47
U.S.C. § 605 (2006) (unauthorized publication or use of communications), with 47
U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (unauthorized reception of cable service).
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replacement and use for commercial purposes251 of ―any
equipment or software designed or adapted to give access to a
protected service.‖252
Even if their cybertravel tools are not used to bypass the
payment of a fee, cybertravel providers should be concerned about
their liability under anti-hacking provisions. These provisions
target not only hackers but also those who provide tools for
hacking, such as ―any password or similar information through
which a computer may be accessed without authorization.‖253
Cybertravel tools could be viewed as such ―similar information,‖
and therefore, tool providers could face civil and criminal liability
under anti-hacking laws, subject to the limitations mentioned
above that are applicable to cybertravelers.254 Additionally,
limitations associated with territoriality may exist in countries
where the liability of providers of hacking tools is drafted in the
form of secondary liability.
Another danger for cybertravel providers is direct liability for
secondary transmission. Other services that resemble cybertravel
have been designed to ―place shift,‖ or to facilitate the viewing of
content elsewhere that is broadcast or made available to a limited
geographical area, and some of these similar services have been
challenged based on their retransmission of the content. For
instance, in Japan a service called ManekiTV offered ―a locationfree, Internet-based transmission‖ of Japanese television programs
for a fee;255 in January 2011 the Supreme Court of Japan held that
the service infringed copyright.256 In the United States, a similar

251

1998 EU Conditional Access Directive, supra note 248, at art. 4.
Id. at art. 2(e).
253
18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(6) (2008). Under national provisions that implement Article 5
of EU Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA in the EU member states, such tool
providers could be criminally liable. See Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of
the European Union of 24 February 2005 on attacks against information systems, 2005
O.J. (L 69) 67, 69. For limitations on liability under that legislation, see supra notes
233–35 and accompanying text. See also Computer Misuse Act, 1990, c. 18, § 3A (Eng.).
254
See supra notes 230–35 and accompanying text.
255
Aritake, supra note 23; see also MANEKITV, supra note 19.
256
See Aritake, supra note 23.
252
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service has been attacked in WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc..257 ivi‘s online
TV player allows users to view on the Internet broadcasts that were
originally available over the air.258 In February 2011, the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of New York issued a
preliminary injunction against ivi, Inc.,259 determining that the
service is not eligible for the statutory license established by the
U.S. Copyright Act for cable services.260
It may be argued that there is an important difference between
place shifting services and cybertravel. While the technologies
employed by ManekiTV and ivi require that the services retransmit
the signal to provide access to additional viewers, cybertravel
technologies, with one exception, do not involve the retransmission
of a signal. Instead of retransmitting a signal, cybertravel tools
relocate the user in cyberspace so that the user can access the
content directly from the original website. The tools do not
retransmit the content; rather, they ―shift‖ the perceived location of
the viewer. The one exception might be website cybertravel
tools—websites that display web pages based on users‘ requests.
These tools could be described as operating on the principle of
retransmission; however, as noted earlier, this type of tool is
unlikely to be utilized for content streaming because it involves
slow connection speeds.261
257

WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
IVI, supra note 16.
259
WPIX, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 622. Other services, such as Slingbox, a U.S. service
that allows users to ―[w]atch and control [their] TV shows over the Internet from
anywhere in the world,‖ could face similar challenges depending on their particular
technology. SLINGBOX, http://www.slingbox.com/go/slingbox (last visited Feb. 2, 2012).
The Slingbox concept is similar to the bypassing of geolocation that is described in Part
III of this paper as ―self-sustained‖ cybertravel because Slingbox also requires a user‘s
own device (the Slingbox) located in another country. A similar service in Japan is
Rokuraku. See H. Kikuchi, Comment on the Rokuraku II decision, 41 INT‘L REV. INTELL.
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 860 (2010); see also ROKURAKU, http://www.rokuraku.com/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
260
17 U.S.C §111(c)(1) (2006). The Register of Copyrights has proposed that the
provision be phased out. Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act: Section 302
Report, REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.copyright.gov/reports/
section302-report.pdf.
For additional examples see, supra notes 16–21 and
accompanying text.
261
See supra Part III.
258
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Although the phrase ―making available‖ that is used in the
1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 2001 EU Information
Society Directive might seem to capture the involvement of
cybertravel providers in the acts of cybertravel better than
retransmission, public performance, or public display,262 ―making
available‖ might not cover cybertravel providers‘ conduct. The
right to communicate a copyrighted work to the public in Article 8
of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and Article 3 of the 2001 EU
Information Society Directive263 indeed includes the component of
―making available to the public.‖264 However, the Agreed
Statement Concerning Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty
suggests that the component does not create specific liability for
passive behavior,265 and explains that Article 8 does not impose
liability for acts of ―mere provision of physical facilities for
enabling or making a communication.‖ Similarly, recital 23 of the
2001 EU Information Society Directive states that the right
―should cover any . . . transmission or retransmission of a work to
the public‖ and that the ―right should not cover any other acts.‖266
The Directive is different from the WIPO Treaty in that, with
respect to holders of rights to specific subject matter in Article
3(2),267 the Directive does appear to create a new ―right to make

262

17 U.S.C. §§ 106(4)–(5) (2006); see also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508
F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
263
See 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3; Case C306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles
SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519.
264
WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36
I.L.M. 65, 70 (1996); 2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3.
265
The phrase is used to clarify the scope of the term ―public.‖ ―[T]he making
available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the public may
access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.‖ WIPO
Copyright Treaty art. 8, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65, 70
(1996). See also the definition of performing or displaying a work ―publicly‖ in 17
U.S.C. §101 (2006) (providing the definition of performing or displaying a work
―publicly‖); Goldstein & Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 328–29.
266
2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 23.
267
The ―exclusive right to authorize or prohibit the making available to the public‖ is
provided to
performers, of fixations of their performances; . . . for phonogram
producers, of their phonograms; . . . for the producers of the first
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available to the public,‖ which ―cover[s] all acts of making
available such subject-matter to members of the public,‖268
meaning acts that are not restricted to transmission or
retransmission.269 However, the Directive repeats that ―[t]he mere
provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a
communication does not in itself amount to communication,‖270
leaving open the question of whether providing cybertravel tools is
equivalent to providing ―facilities‖ and thus exempted from
liability under the ―making available‖ provision of the Directive.271
In the United States, cybertravel providers might benefit from an
exemption that passive carriers enjoy from liability for the
―secondary transmission of a performance or display of a work.‖272
Indirect liability may be limited by safe harbor provisions that
protect Internet intermediaries from secondary liability for Internet
users‘ conduct; the provisions may also apply to cybertravel
providers.273 Safe harbor provisions apply to Internet service

fixations of films, of the original and copies of their films; . . . for
broadcasting organization, of fixations of their broadcasts, whether
these broadcasts are transmitted by wire or over the air, including by
cable or satellite.
2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at art. 3(2).
268
Id. at recital 24.
269
On conflicting European decisions concerning hyperlinks, see Bechtold, supra note
185, at 343, 361.
270
2001 EU Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 27.
271
It speaks in favor of such an interpretation that recital 25 of the Directive seems to
suggest that Article 3(2) should target on-demand transmission services. 2001 EU
Information Society Directive, supra note 187, at recital 25. However, recital 23 of the
Directive calls for a broad interpretation of the right. Id. at recital 23. See also Case C306/05, Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) v. Rafael Hoteles
SA, 2006 E.C.R. I-11519, at par. 36. In ITV v. TV CatchUp Ltd., Justice Floyd opined
that TV CatchUP does not ―merely provide technical means to ensure or improve
reception . . . It is not merely supportive of the original exploitation of the work.‖ ITV v.
TV CatchUp Ltd. [2011] EWHC 1874 (Pat), [98]. See also Bechtold, supra note 185, at
343, 361. As Goldstein and Hugenholtz note, ―[p]osting hyperlinks to works already
available on websites, however, is not an independent act of communication.‖ Goldstein
& Hugenholtz, supra note 226, at 329–30.
272
17 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2010).
273
E.g., Id. § 512; Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market, arts. 12–15, 2000 O.J. (L 178).
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providers without regard to the location of users who connect to
their networks; therefore, in the case of the most basic cybertravel,
which consists of a dial-up connection to a foreign Internet service
provider,274 the fact that the user connects from another country
should not defeat the safe harbor that the service provider enjoys.
Even cybertravel providers that are not Internet service providers
can probably benefit from the provisions of the safe harbors that
are designed for transitory digital network communications.275
Not all countries offer safe harbor provisions for Internet
intermediaries, and even those countries that do offer safe harbor
provisions may limit their safe harbors to secondary liability for
infringements of only certain laws. Moreover, the safe harbor
provisions will certainly not protect cybertravel providers from
liability for actively inducing infringements. To limit their indirect
liability, cybertravel providers will likely market their tools in a
manner that does not suggest that they are promoting copyright
infringement or other rights infringement by end users.276 For
instance, instead of advertising that their tools will allow users to
watch specific copyrighted content, the providers may choose
nonspecific language to advertise the fact that their tools may
enable users to watch television programs in general.277
Cybertravel providers may also attempt to limit their exposure
to indirect liability by disassociating their activities from the
countries from which users, who use their tools, cybertravel.278
274

See supra Part III.
E.g., 17 U.S.C. §512(a); Directive 2000/31/EC, supra note 273, at art. 12 (―Mere
conduit‖).
276
On the ―dual use‖ technologies that may serve both legal and illegal purposes see
Stefan Bechtold, supra note 185, at 343, 387. ―In general, in such ‗dual use‘ cases, [the
provision on protection of technological measures] probably applies as long as the
technological measure is not misused primarily for the purpose to substitute the absence
of copyright protection by technological protection.‖ Id. at 387; see also Metro-GoldwynMayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, 545 U.S. 913, 936–41 (2005).
277
E.g., MY EXPAT NETWORK, supra note 150 (Note: the U.K. top-level domain name,
the price in British pounds, the website strictly addressing British expatriates living
outside the United Kingdom, and the language about watching ―UK TV abroad.‖).
278
See Martin Senftleben, commentary on the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty, in
CONCISE EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW 87, 102–03; see also Bechtold, supra note 185, at
343, 362.
275
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Although the likelihood of success of such attempts is
questionable, it is instructive to review their model.279 For
example, a cybertravel provider in Hungary might offer a
cybertravel tool to Hungarians who travel abroad and wish to view
Hungarian programs online that are not accessible outside of
Hungary. The provider could argue that because any acts of
potential direct copyright infringement would be committed by
users outside Hungary, and therefore under foreign (nonHungarian) copyright laws, no indirect liability of the cybertravel
provider for copyright infringement should arise in Hungary under
Hungarian law. Of course, the provider would also claim that it
had not directed its operations at the countries in which acts of
direct infringement occur (all countries other than Hungary), but
only at Hungary, and thereby attempt to limit its exposure to
personal jurisdiction outside Hungary.280 Indeed, a provider could
support its claim if its website were in Hungarian, as that would
suggest that it had only targeted customers inside the sole country
in which Hungarian is widely spoken and understood.281
Although existing laws do not address cybertravel, a number of
legal doctrines may apply to various aspects of cybertravel, and it
is for the courts to decide which, if any, of these existing doctrines
apply. The lack of any specific legislative provisions addressing
cybertravel is not surprising given the brief history of the use of
geolocation tools to limit access to certain content and the
relatively recent advent of cybertravel. So far there appear to be
no cases raising the question of the legality of cybertravel, whether
in the context of copyright law or of other laws pertaining to
conduct on the Internet. Whether or not courts decide to deem
279

See supra note 277.
One could be found secondarily liable for copyright infringement in the country
where direct infringement occurred. E.g., Columbia Pictures Ind., Inc. v. Gary Fung, No.
CV 06-5578 SVW (JCx), 2009 WL 6355911, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2009);
Armstrong v. Virgin Records, Ltd., 91 F. Supp. 2d 628, 634–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
281
See Joined Cases C-585/08 & C-144/09, Peter Pammer v. Reederei Karl Schluter
GmbH & Co KG and Hotel Aplenhof GesmbH v. Oliver Heller (2010), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62008CJ0585:EN:
HTML (describing the European Union‘s treatment of websites for purposes of personal
jurisdiction).
280
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cybertravel legal under existing laws, it is time to discuss the future
of cybertravel.
B. Should Cybertravel be Legal?
Although current legal regimes do not directly address
cybertravel and court cases dealing with cybertravel appear to be
nonexistent, it would be a mistake to think that cybertravel will
continue to remain outside the scope of legal inquiry.282 The need
to erect borders on the Internet to prevent the undesirable results of
the application of cyberlaw 2.0283 seems to dictate only one
possible future for cybertravel: making it illegal. Without making
or keeping cybertravel illegal, the goal of those who want a
territorial partitioning of the Internet will be defeated or
significantly endangered. Therefore it seems that, regardless of its
current status, it is imperative that cybertravel be declared
illegal.284
This section discusses the apparently grim and
inevitable fate of cybertravel and then attempts to identify potential
arguments for saving it.
1. Cybertravel as a Misrepresentation of One‘s True Location
There currently exists no right to know a user‘s true IP address,
and no corresponding obligation for a user to reveal his true IP
address; however, this could change in light of the developments
outlined above.285 The developments appear to dictate that in the
future a user‘s IP address be unchangeable; if that be the case, an
IP address will constitute an element of a user‘s digital identity that
the user would not be permitted to alter. The user would have a
282
Cf. Yvette Joy Liebesman, The Wisdom of Legislating for Anticipated Technological
Advancements, 10 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 154, 157 (2010) (warning that ―we
should proceed with caution in allowing the potential effects of either technology in its
infancy or future unrealized technology to influence our policy decisions before the
science has had a chance to mature and develop, and its effects on society better
determined.‖).
283
See supra notes 5, 51–58 and accompanying text.
284
Such appears to be the solution in the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261,
112th Cong., § 102(c)(4)(A)(ii) (2011).
285
In theory, at least, cases could exist in which changing an IP address could be
viewed as an act of misrepresentation. See, e.g., Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2006) (misrepresentation of the origin of goods).
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disclosure obligation that he would have to fulfill by always
presenting himself to the outside world with his true IP address.
The change from IPv4 to IPv6 may support the idea of nonchangeability of IP addresses. If one of the virtues of IPv6 is the
ability to identify a particular device by its IP address, allowing
users to change the IP addresses of their devices, even if only
temporarily, would render the virtue worthless. Experts have
promised that having IP addresses permanently assigned or
embedded in various devices will be an advance that will spur
further innovation in the online world because new applications
may thereafter be developed to target specific devices connected to
the Internet, and these devices will no longer be limited to
computers or cell phones but will include devices such as cars,
refrigerators, washing machines and other appliances.286 Allowing
cybertravel would hinder this development because applications
could not rely on the user leaving the fixed IP address of a device
unaltered.
In addition to being inconsistent with the interests of the parties
aligned in support of IPv6, cybertravel also appears to be
inconsistent with the desires of governments and the private sector
to erect borders on the Internet. In spite of the zeal of true Internet
enthusiasts to remain faithful to the original concept of the
borderless network,287 there are reasons why both governments and
the private sector need a territorial partitioning of the Internet. Use
of geolocation tools by website operators appears to be a
reasonable method of erecting borders on the network;288 however,
the functioning of these tools can be undermined by cybertravel,
which evades the tools and defeats the partitioning. Outlawing
cybertravel seems to be a logical answer in support of the borderbuilding process.

286
See, e.g., ICANN IPv6 News Conference: Miami, Fl., YOUTUBE (Feb. 3, 2011),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gveJs6YRYXU.
287
See supra Part I.
288
See id.
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2. Cybertravel and the Right to Obscure One‘s Location289
The ability to assign permanent IP addresses to every device
connected to the Internet, and the ability to attribute acts on the
Internet to those devices and possibly to particular persons, raises
serious privacy concerns.290 This possibility explains an increasing
interest, or even determination, among Internet users for options to
change their IP addresses as a way of maintaining their privacy on
the Internet. Indeed, services already exist that offer a simple way
to obscure information about users‘ Internet connections by
altering users‘ IP addresses.291 These anonymizing services do not
fit the definition of cybertravel because users do not necessarily
use the services to evade geolocation to ―travel‖ to another
country; users seeking anonymization often want only to obscure
their own IP address but do not care about the location of the
replacement IP address.292
It might appear that the debate about the availability of
anonymous Internet browsing relates to the future of
cybertravel;293 however, there is not necessarily a link between the
legality of anonymization and the legality of cybertravel. The law
may permit a change of IP address for the purposes of
anonymization, yet require that the replacement IP address also be
located in the jurisdiction of the user‘s physical location. This
approach would achieve a certain level of anonymization that
might be sufficient for many purposes,294 and yet maintain the
desired localization specificity of the IP address. The localization
might not be detailed enough to bring the user localized
289

I am indebted for this term to Megan M. Carpenter, Associate Professor of Law at
Texas Wesleyan School of Law, who proposed its use in this context.
290
If you were concerned about someone hacking into your computer you might decide
that having someone hack into the contents of your refrigerator would be worse.
291
See supra Part III (discussing examples of such concerns).
292
See id.
293
See, e.g., Paul Ohm, The Rise and Fall of Invasive ISP Surveillance, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1417, 1455–60 (2009) (discussing anonymization on the Internet).
294
Anonymization in the same jurisdiction might not, in fact, always be sufficient–for
example, if the jurisdiction is too small or has an insufficient number of Internet users
with the same characteristics, identification of the particular user might be possible.
Similarly, anonymization within the same jurisdiction will not work if the desire for
anonymization is combined with a need to cybertravel.
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information about restaurants, for example, but would be
sufficiently detailed to allow website operators to detect the
jurisdiction from which the user is connecting and adjust the
accessibility of content accordingly. This solution would allow
users a certain degree of anonymization but give them no ability to
obscure their location to the point of avoiding compliance with
territorially-defined laws and regulations.
Similarly, legalization of cybertravel does not automatically
dictate a legalization of anonymization; depending on the structure
of legal cybertravel, legalization of anonymization might be
unnecessary and also undesirable. For instance, legal cybertravel
might be conditioned upon the use of a digital passport that would
identify not only the user‘s location or domicile but also the user‘s
identity or account;295 such a condition would permit cybertravel
but require that the user maintain accurate information about his or
her identity. This solution would allow cybertravel but defeat
anonymization; users would be able to obscure their current
location if, for instance, the digital passport required information
about the user‘s domicile or residence but not the user‘s current
location.
If the future of the Internet includes permanently assigned IP
addresses, anonymous Internet speech may have to be safeguarded
by means other than the obscuring of one‘s IP address, and
alternative means are likely to require careful attention to the
protection of privacy.296 It is possible that privacy law could
develop before any policy decisions are made concerning
anonymization or cybertravel, and some experts will undoubtedly
argue that as privacy protection becomes stronger for IP addresses,
the arguments in favor of allowing users to change their IP
addresses should yield.297 Some experts may present this outcome

295

See infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the impact of selecting the domicile instead of
the current location.
296
There will be someone in the process—some other ―anonymizer‖—who will know
the IP address of the Internet user; therefore, privacy rules will have to protect the user
from having this information disclosed.
297
On the current difficulties of defining IP addresses as personal data or personally
identifiable data see the following recent decisions: Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal
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as a necessary compromise: the law will protect a user‘s personally
identifiable information, but the user will be expected to keep it
personally identifiable. Although information subject to privacy
protection must lead to the identification of a particular person (by
definition), there seems to be no link between providing protection
to such information and requiring that the particular person not
change the information. The result of the debate may impact the
design of cybertravel but should not be dispositive of the question
of whether cybertravel should be legal or not; the answers to the
questions about cybertravel and anonymization should not be
mutually dependent.
3. Cybertravel as an Equivalent to Physical Travel
Because the developments outlined earlier appear to dictate
that cybertravel be illegal in the future, it is difficult to find an
argument for allowing cybertravel. One attempt is to analogize
cybertravel to physical travel and claim an equivalent right to
travel in cyberspace. If cybertravel is considered equivalent to
physical travel, it can be argued that cybertravel should be
permissible in some form and enjoy the same protections that
physical travel—and in particular international travel—does.
The right to travel internationally has been recognized in the
United States as a constitutional right,298 and is implied as a human
right in international human rights treaties.299 In the 1958 case

Supreme Court] Sept. 8, 2010, 136 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN
BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] II 508 (Switz.). (―It is impossible to determine in the abstract
whether IP addresses [particularly dynamically assigned addresses] are personal data.‖
Id.); Media C.A.T. Ltd. v. Malcolm Adams et al., [2011] EWPCC (En.) 6, [91]. See also
Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société Belge des Auteurs, Compositeurs et
Éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.
jsf?text=&docid=115202&pageIndex=0&doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=
1&cid=763036; see generally Joshua J. McIntyre, Balancing Expectations of Online
Privacy: Why Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected As Personally
Identifiable Information, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 895 (2011).
298
See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Timothy Zick, The First
Amendment in Trans-Border Perspective: Toward a More Cosmopolitan Orientation, 52
B. C. L. R. 941, 954 (2011).
299
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10 1948, G.A. Res. 217A U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810, art. 13(2) (1948) (includes ―the right
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Kent v. Dulles,300 the Supreme Court of the United States discussed
the constitutional right to travel internationally and explained the
underpinnings of that right, surveyed the roots of the right in U.S.
history and traditions,301 and quoted Zechariah Chafee on social
values associated with the freedom of movement.302 Although
some of the values cited in Kent v. Dulles are not pertinent to the
present discussion of cybertravel (values of allowing families to
reunite, persons to work in other countries),303 others, such as
educational values and the values of learning different viewpoints,
are very relevant.304 ―In many different ways,‖ the Supreme Court
quoted Chafee, ―direct contact with other countries contributes to
sounder decisions at home.‖305 It would seem that cybertravel is as
much associated with these values as physical travel is.306
Even if, by analogy with physical travel, the right to travel
internationally is extended to cybertravel, the right to cybertravel
would be subject to limitation through governmental regulation
analogous to the regulation that is applicable to physical travel. In
the United States the right to travel internationally is subject to
rational basis scrutiny, which allows the government to use
reasonable means to limit the right as long as the limitation is
to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country‖); Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, September 16, 1963, art. 2(2)
(includes the freedom ―to leave any country, including his own‖); International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(2) (includes a provision that ―[e]veryone shall be
free to leave any country, including his own‖); American Convention for Human Rights,
Opened for Signature Nov. 22, 1969, Ch II, art. 22(2) (provides that ―every person has
the right to leave any country freely, including his own‖).
300
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
301
Id. at 125–26.
302
Id. at 126–27 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)).
303
Id. (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)). In some contexts the right to be allowed to
work in another country could require the right to cybertravel.
304
Id. (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)).
305
Id. at 127 (quoting ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION
OF 1787 195–96 (Univ. of Kansas Press 1956)).
306
But cf. Zick, supra note 298, at 1004 (noting that the decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court that followed Kent v. Dulles ―effectively neutered any First Amendment liberty to
travel abroad for purposes of inquiry and information-gathering‖).
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rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.307
Similarly, international treaties on human rights recognize that the
right to travel across national borders may be limited.308 For
instance, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, to which the United States has been a party since 1977 and
which it ratified in 1992, allows restrictions of the right as long as
the restrictions ―are provided by law, are necessary to protect
national security, public order (ordre public), public health or
morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with
the other rights recognized in the . . . Covenant.‖309 One of the
generally accepted restrictions is the requirement that persons
traveling across national borders carry passports that identify them
and thereby allow countries to monitor the movement of persons.
Indeed, it could be foreseen that in the digital environment
countries could impose a similar requirement for cybertravel.
Some might argue that there is an even stronger argument for
the protection of cybertravel—the right of access to information.310
International treaties, including treaties to which the United States
is a party, define the right of freedom of expression to include the
right to access information from wherever it may be located. For
example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
protects the right ―to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.‖311 In the
United States some commentators have advocated that the right to

307

See Califano v. Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 178 (1978). This is different from
domestic travel, which is protected by a higher level of scrutiny. Id. at 176–78.
308
But the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights does not include a provision
on limitations of the right. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res 217 (III) A,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
309
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 12(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 99
U.N.T.S. 171; see also Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights art. 2(3),
Sept. 16, 1963, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; American Convention on Human Rights art. 22(3),
Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143.
310
On the potential overlap between the right to travel and the right to free speech see
Zick, supra note 298, at 954–57, 985–86, 1004–12.
311
Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) (emphasis added). See infra note 320 for other treaties
that protect the right to seek, receive and impart information without territorial
limitations.
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travel internationally be derived from the free speech protection of
the First Amendment rather than from the Due Process Clause
because of the values encompassed by international travel.312
Advocates of this view could use cybertravel to help persuade
countries to acknowledge this link between the right to
international travel and the right to free speech; to many, the link
may be more relevant in the context of cybertravel than physical
travel.313 If countries refuse to link the concepts, of course,
equating cybertravel to physical travel would not improve
cybertravel‘s chances of benefitting from the protection of access
to information.
Any attempt to extend the rights of international travel or
access to information to cyberspace would certainly not be the first
attempt to assert constitutional and human rights in cyberspace.314
The first constitutional right to receive attention in the context of
the Internet was the right to free speech; users have asserted this
right when faced with limitations on Internet speech imposed by
other countries. The Yahoo!315 and Viewfinder316 cases are
examples of cases in which U.S. courts have denied recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments because of the significant

312
Zick, supra note 298, at 1005, 1008; see also supra INTRODUCTION (discussing the
values associated with travel).
313
Zick is concerned that the focus on protecting free speech on the Internet will
distract attention from the need to protect international travel:
[I]t may be tempting to reason that because speech can transcend
territorial borders via the Internet, there is less need for a fundamental
right of cross-border movement. But even in the digital era, freedom
of speech and other First Amendment liberties still depend upon
rights of cross-border movement and trans-border informationgathering. . . . [I]t remains important that we have a constitutional
foundation for cross-border movement and intermingling.
Zick, supra note 298, at 1004–05.
Cybertravel is an activity on the Internet that could provide additional support for
the right to travel internationally.
314
E.g., Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the Internet, Version 1.1 for
Consultation, INTERNET RIGHTS & PRINCIPLES COAL., http://www.freedomofexpression.
org.uk/files/DRAFTVersion1.1%283%29.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2011).
315
Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L‘Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001), rev‘d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
316
Sarl Louis Feraud Intl. v. Viewfinder, Inc., 489 F.3d 474 (2d Cir. 2007).
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public policy embedded in the U.S. constitutional guarantee of free
speech. In line with these cases and other cases involving foreign
libel judgments and speech on the Internet, the 2010 SPEECH Act
ensures that no foreign defamation judgments will be recognized in
the United States unless they comport with U.S. standards of free
speech.317
One problem in asserting the right to free speech on the
Internet is that the functioning of the Internet depends on non-state
actors, and only when constitutional rights or human rights involve
governmental action that must be effectuated on the Internet by
non-state actors (such as recognition and enforcement of a foreign
judgment, or content filtering mandated by the government) will an
assertion of constitutional rights on the Internet be possible.318
Given the importance of the Internet, it is not surprising that
experts such as Christoph B. Graber are calling for an extension of
the rights to bind private actors on the Internet;319 the actors to be
bound by the rights should be the providers of critical Internet
infrastructure, such as Internet service providers, intermediaries,
and others who are providers of web services that are unique and
indispensible to the usability of the Internet. Graber gives an
example of preemptive filtering that demonstrates the risk of
serious intrusions into the right to ―communicative freedom,‖
which in his definition includes not only the right to free speech,
but also the ―passive‖ aspect of the right, which is the right of
access to information—a right that is embedded in international
human rights treaties.320 The filtering in Graber‘s example is
317

Securing and Protecting our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage
(SPEECH) Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–05 (2010).
318
On ―Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere of the Internet‖ from a comparative
perspective see Graber, supra note 42, at 17–20.
319
See generally Graber, supra note 42; see also Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without
Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986,
988 (2008) (―[I]f individuals‘ speech should not be attributed to intermediaries when it is
unlawful, we should at least consider ways in which intermediaries could be deterred
from interfering with it when it is lawful.‖). Rebecca Tushnet argues that ―if we limit
intermediary responsibility . . . we should also limit intermediary power to control
speech.‖ Id. at 1009.
320
The ―right to freedom of opinion and expression . . . includes the freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
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conducted by intermediaries who block user access to peer-to-peer
networking sites or other websites with potentially infringing
content, thereby preemptively censoring speech that might not be
infringing at all.321
Such censorship, if conducted by a
government, would be contrary to free speech protections and
subject to legal recourse; however, no recourse is available to users
when the filtering is conducted by private actors.322
Users expect Internet service providers to comply with
constitutional and human rights, and as the Internet has changed
from being solely a means of communication to a medium for
many other activities, such as trade and entertainment, the
expectations for constitutional and human rights on the Internet
have expanded beyond free speech. For example, if users have
built their business models on selling merchandise on eBay, and
eBay at some point no longer allows them to sell on eBay, this has
a drastic impact on their livelihood.
Although an initial

through any media and regardless of frontiers.‖ Universal Declaration of Human Rights
art. 19, G.A. Res 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). The right to
freedom of expression ―shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form
of art, or through any other media of his choice.‖ International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights art. 19(2), Dec. 16, 1966, 99 U.N.T.S. 171. (emphasis added). For
permissible limitations on the right see id. at art. 19(3). The right to freedom of
expression ―shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.‖ European
Convention on Human Rights art. 10(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis
added). For permissible limitations on the right see id. at art. 10(2); see also American
Convention on Human Rights art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143;
Recommendation CM/Rec(2008)6 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe to member states on measures to promote the respect for freedom of expression
and information with regard to Internet filters, Mar. 26, 2008.
321
Graber, supra note 42, at 10. For a similar argument concerning a ―prior restraint by
proxy,‖ see Wendy Seltzer, Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright‘s Safe Harbor: Chilling
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 171 (2010).
Seltzer notes that the actions of service providers in her example are mandated by law
and states that ―[g]overnment cannot insulate itself from responsibility for this
abridgment of free speech by routing its influence through third-party service providers.‖
Id. at 190.
322
See also Peter K. Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L.R. 1373, 1398 (2010) (in
the context of takedowns by service providers based on DMCA notifications and the
graduated response approach).
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incarnation of the problem of Internet users‘ expectations clashing
with Internet service providers‘ actions was small merchants
demanding continuing access to eBay,323 the subsequent debate
about network neutrality shows that the problem of accessibility
has entered a new and more critical stage.324 Not only is the right
to free speech at stake, but other rights are as well. For instance,
following the unrest in Egypt in January and February 2011,
Mohamed ElBaradei, the leading opposition figure, was quoted as
observing that prior to the shutdown of the Internet by the
government, the Internet had provided the right to freedom of
association that was missing de facto on the ground.325 Indeed, it
is an exercise of this constitutional right that today‘s Internet users
expect private actors such as Twitter or Facebook to facilitate. It is
understandable that people relying on the infrastructure of the
Internet will search for constitutional protections for their access to
the infrastructure.326
Constitutional and human rights may in the future shield
Internet users not only from governmental intrusion, but also from
certain acts by Internet service providers and other providers of
critical infrastructure—regardless of whether such acts result from
indirect governmental intervention or voluntary decisions by
providers.327 The right to travel should enjoy parity with the right
to free speech, the right to free assembly, the right to access to
323

―PowerSellers‖ on eBay objected to eBay‘s practice of denying them access to the
auction website based on repeated complaints filed against them under the DMCA, 17
U.S.C. §512(c)(3) (2006). For a discussion of the problem, see Trimble, Enemy Ground,
supra note 173, at 808–09.
324
Cecilia Kang, FCC Approves Net-Neutrality Rules; Criticism Is Immediate, WASH.
POST (Dec. 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/
12/21/AR2010122106110.html.
325
Interview by NPR with Laban Coblentz, a speechwriter for Mohamed ElBaradei
(Feb. 7, 2011), available at http://thestory.org/archive/the_story_020711_full_show.mp3/
view.
326
Although private actors who furnish critical infrastructure may resist any new legal
obligations that countries may attempt to impose upon them, the actors may have no
choice other than to accept the additional obligations: if a critical part of the Internet is in
the hands of one or a small number of private actors, countries will have a limited
ability—short of nationalizing that part of the Internet—to protect constitutional rights in
cyberspace.
327
See Interview by NPR with Laban Coblentz, supra note 325.
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information, and other recognized constitutional and human rights
that should be fully implemented on the Internet.
C. Can Cybertravel be Legal?
If we accept the premise that cybertravel, or the capability of a
user to evade geolocation and use the Internet as if he were located
in a location other than where he is physically located, is socially
valuable and worth permitting in some form, the question turns to
the conditions under which cybertravel could be legal. As
explained earlier, the existence of this capability does not depend
on permitting anonymity on the Internet;328 anonymization and
cybertravel need not go hand in hand.
Thinking about the possible future of cybertravel requires
considering all of the various policies and business motives that
lead website operators to limit access to their content on the
Internet.329 First, website operators design content limitations to
enhance user convenience by localizing accessible content, for
example by showing advertisements for local businesses. Second,
website operators may have contractual obligations with content
providers, for example to limit access to video programs that a
provider has licensed only for certain countries or regions.330
Third, the operators may limit access to content to comply with
laws that prohibit certain types of content in certain countries, for
example by blocking gambling when it is outlawed by some
countries. Prohibitions may also apply, however, for lessmaligned content that may be made inaccessible because of
countries‘ legal requirements—for instance, countries‘ consumer
protection laws may require certain products to be offered only if
they have been certified for use in the country.331 Fourth, website
operators may decide voluntarily to limit access to content to avoid
being exposed to personal jurisdiction and liability in certain
countries where they wish to avoid litigation, taxes, regulation or
some other type of obligation. Finally, website operators may
328
329
330
331

See supra Part IV.B.2.
See supra Part II.A (discussing the various reasons).
Id.
Id.
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implement access limitations for security reasons; for example, a
bank will not allow a user from outside the account holder‘s
country of residence to log into the account holder‘s account
because the bank assumes that such a login is a fraudulent attempt
to access the account.
The first type of restriction—content localized for advertising
or for user convenience—should cause the least difficulty. There
should be no reason for prohibiting users from viewing this type of
content as if they were sitting in another country. In fact, website
operators such as Google and Lufthansa offer links to allow users
to switch easily among different country versions.332 This
switching may not be completely without cost to the website
operator, however; if users regularly escape the ―convenience‖ of
localized content and use other country versions in lieu of their
own local versions, it may diminish website operators‘ advertising
revenues because they lose some of the advantage that a
partitioned cyberspace provides in allowing them to charge
premium advertising rates for advertisements that target local
consumers.
Cybertravel that is used to evade the other types of access
limitations listed above is problematic. It is unrealistic to expect
countries to allow users connecting to the Internet from their
territory to bypass any prohibitions against certain content or
activities by cybertraveling to another country where such content
or activities are expressly or implicitly permitted. Allowing
cybertravel for these purposes would defeat the public policies
behind the prohibitions and undermine national sovereignty.
Similarly, it is difficult to defend cybertravel that is used for the
purpose of bypassing geolocation tools employed by website
operators who are complying with contractual obligations, seeking
to avoid personal jurisdiction and liability, or protecting
themselves and others against criminal activities. The question is
whether there is a way to permit cybertravel when it is conducted
to avoid these types of limitations, but the conduct has a legitimate
goal, such as accessing one‘s own bank account from a foreign
332

Id.
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country. The method of cybertravel is not important, because the
tools for its implementation will change;333 what is important is
that travel to another portion of cyberspace be possible.334
There are three perspectives from which possible solutions for
the future of cybertravel will arise: legal, technological and
business. As has been shown by other examples in the Internet
environment, a combination of solutions from all three
perspectives seems most likely to succeed. For example, laws that
prohibit copyright infringement have not stopped online music
piracy, and neither have filters that have been imposed by Internet
service providers or automatic warnings that are generated by
college campus service providers. Although these measures and
laws addressing piracy have probably slowed online music and
film piracy, the solutions had to be assisted by business solutions,
such as iTunes and Netflix, to offer a legal and viable alternative to
piracy.
As discussed earlier in section IV.A, a number of legal
doctrines cover issues potentially associated with cybertravel;
however, because these doctrines were neither created for nor
shaped with cybertravel in mind, courts will be required to
determine the extent to which the doctrines may make illegal all or
some instances of cybertravel.335
Whatever the status of
cybertravel will be, it will be beneficial to clarify the applicability
of existing laws to cybertravel and possibly draft specific
regulations to govern cybertravel further. If IPv6 makes IPv4
obsolete and a transition actually occurs to permanently assigned
or embedded IP addresses, the transition could provide momentum
for the creation of cybertravel-specific legislation, and perhaps
even for an agreement on a legislative solution at the international
level.
Within some permitted extent, cybertravel, as an equivalent to
physical international travel, could be subject to reasonable

333

See supra Part III (explaining the functioning of various cybertravel tools).
See supra Part I (explaining the ―borderlessness‖ of the Internet and the impetus for
partitioning of the Internet).
335
See supra Part IV.A.
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limitations. Traditionally, the obligation to carry a passport is
considered one such limitation, and a digital passport could serve
this purpose for cybertravel. The passport could either be a virtual
equivalent to a physical passport and carry the same personally
identifiable data of the holder/Internet user, or be a document with
only limited information, such as the user‘s location. The location
identified in either type of passport could be either the current
physical location of the user or the place of residence or domicile
of the user, depending on the criterion that was set as the factor
determining the accessibility of the Internet content.
Although intuition seems to dictate the selection of the user‘s
current physical location as the determining factor, the other
option—place of residence or domicile—should not be summarily
excluded. The prevailing principle of territoriality of law suggests
that current physical location be the correct solution; under the
principle, laws apply territorially, or alternatively stated, the
prescriptive jurisdiction of a country extends only to the country‘s
borders—and outside its borders only to the extent that the
country‘s jurisdiction covers acts that have effects within its
borders. Another principle, the principle of personality of law,
exists as well, but with less applicability because the principle of
territoriality of law applies to the vast majority of the legislative
activities of a country. The use of residence or domicile as the
determinative factor for access to Internet content would present a
remarkable opportunity to introduce the principle of personality of
law for activity on the Internet. Under this principle countries
legislate for their own nationals and permanent residents and the
laws follow those persons wherever they travel. An analysis of the
issues surrounding personality of law on the Internet is beyond the
scope of this article and deserves a separate study, but is worth
mentioning.
A law for digital passports cannot exist without a technological
implementation. It is not difficult to imagine such a system if the
IPv6-related vision of permanently assigned or embedded IP
addresses that would identify specific devices (or even persons if
the devices were embedded in human bodies) becomes a reality;
the law could make it illegal to change or reroute an IP address
because that act would be equivalent to forging a physical
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passport. The digital passport would inform each website operator
about the location of the user, or the user‘s residence or domicile,
depending on the information in the passport.
Knowing exactly how many cybertravelers are connecting to a
website and from what locations could assist intellectual property
owners, for example, in the creation of tailored licensing
schemes;336 if information about cybertravelers were to include
personal identifiers, the system could become what Paul Goldstein
described in 1994 as the ―celestial jukebox‖337—a service that
would allow on-demand access to copyrighted works from
anywhere in the world for a fee.338 The digital environment is
perfectly equipped to implement this system;339 in such a world,
each user could access copyrighted works from anywhere in the
world and be charged only for works that the user accessed. This
is where a technological solution would prompt the need for a
business solution.
What hampers progress towards a ―celestial jukebox‖ are the
significant transaction costs associated with the identification and
location of right holders and the negotiation of licenses with
multiple right holders. The magnitude of these costs must be
addressed in order for global licensing to be feasible, and there are
initiatives being developed in this area to pave the way for this
type of solution;340 for example, experts have proposed that the
World Intellectual Property Organization create and administer an
international repertoire database,341 and other experts are exploring
336

See Loesing et al., supra note 156, at 205 (―There are estimated to be hundreds of
thousands [of] Tor users every day routing their data through the Tor network.‖).
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PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT‘S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 28–29 (1994). Paul Goldstein claims no credit for the celestial jukebox
metaphor.
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See id.
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See Jane C. Ginsburg, International Issues: Which Country‘s Law Applies When
Works Are Made Available Over the Internet?, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 49, 53 (2010)
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Kaitlin Mara & William New, Should WIPO Lead Creation of a Global Repertoire
Database?, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog
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possibilities for cross-border collective management of rights in
the digital environment.342
Even without a celestial jukebox solution that would cover all
works globally, and even without digital passports, there is clearly
space for smaller-scale business solutions to meet the challenges of
cybertravel. If content is limited because of the contractual
obligations of website operators, cybertravel could be enabled by
global or regional licensing schemes that would allow operators to
offer certain content either worldwide or in selected countries.343
Instead of paying cybertravel providers to facilitate cybertravel,
users would pay for access directly to website operators, who
would then bear any licensing costs and any other costs associated
with the content, such as a public television licensing fee.
Of course, these solutions are directed only toward access to
content that is restricted because of contractual limitations; any
content that is illegal in a country will continue to be inaccessible
to users accessing the Internet from that country, and potentially to
nationals or permanent residents of that country even when they
are temporarily present in another country, if digital passports are
used. For certain types of content—and the instances of these
types of content are likely to be limited—countries may reconsider
the legal status of content in light of the possibilities afforded by
digital passports. For example, some countries might reconsider

Court of Justice of the European Union has undertaken what may be interpreted as a push
for pan-European licensing. See Cases C-403/08 & C-429/08, Football Ass‘n Premier
League Ltd. v. QC Leisure (Oct. 4, 2011), available at http://curia.europa.eu
/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=110361&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode
=doc&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=27863.
342
E.g., Torben Toft, Collective Rights Management in the Online World: A Review of
Recent Commission Initiatives, EUR. COMM‘N, DG COMPETITION, at 14 (June 8, 2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/speeches/text/sp2006_008_en.pdf; see generally Brian R.
Day, Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age: The Online
Clearinghouse, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195 (2010); A Digital Agenda for Europe:
Commc‘n from the Comm‘n to the Eur. Parl., the Council, the Eur. Econ. and Social
Comm. and the Comm. of the Regions, COM(2010) 245 final (Aug. 26, 2010).
343
See supra Part IV.A.1 (providing an example of the BBC preparing to launch its TV
shows for viewing by users accessing the BBC website from outside the United
Kingdom).
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their stance on online gambling if they have the ability to tax users
located in their country who use foreign online gambling sites.
The solutions also fail to address cases in which access to
content is limited by a website operator‘s or content provider‘s
choice; these cases arise because of issues of jurisdiction, taxation
or online security. When website operators or content providers
decide sua sponte to restrict their content to certain viewers, users
have minimal recourse; only in rare circumstances will a
government direct private entities to make content more widely
available than it already is. Here a system of digital passports
could prove useful; for example, if access to content were based on
a user‘s permanent residence, content could be made available to a
qualified user while he was temporarily located in another country,
without exposing the website operator to jurisdiction or taxation in
that country.
Finally, knowledge of the numbers and physical locations of
cybertravelers could make possible not only sophisticated licensing
arrangements but also agreements—either private (meaning
between individual content providers and website operators) or
international (meaning among countries)—as to an acceptable
level of free spillover. In the physical world, it is accepted that
some content limited to a certain country will be available to those
who travel to that country. For example, when distribution rights
under copyright are licensed for one country, it is understood that
some of the copyrighted works will land in the hands of persons
who are present in the country only temporarily and those persons
may carry the work with them to other countries; laws provide
exceptions for individual users to do this because it is considered
natural spillover.344 Exceptions for a similar reasonable spillover
could be permitted for cybertravel. However, without information
about the extent of cybertravel, it is impossible to find arguments
344

E.g., Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 60,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; Council Regulation (EC) No 1383/2003 of 22 July 2003
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rights, art. 3(2), 2003 OJ (L 196) 7, 9.
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to support the exceptions for the spillover; a passport system would
allow the collection of such information.
CONCLUSION
This article presents a comprehensive analysis of cybertravel—
the evasion by a user of geolocation that prevents the user from
viewing certain Internet content from the user‘s physical location.
By cybertraveling, the user can view the Internet as if the user
were located in a country other than the country in which the user
is physically located. The goal of the article is to explain what
cybertravel is, why it exists, what purposes it serves, what its legal
status is, what arguments exist for making it available in the future,
and what solutions might be developed to allow users to
cybertravel for legitimate purposes without undermining the
evolution of the Internet. It seems clear that even though
cybertravel will probably not survive in its current form, new
technological and business solutions will preserve the concept and
the law will complement these solutions.
The current importance of questions regarding the future of
cybertravel is heightened by the desire of governments and the
private sector to erect borders on the Internet to achieve
compliance with territorially-defined regulation. This article
assumes that this desire is shaping or will shape the future of the
Internet, and that geolocation tools will play a major role in the
future in light of user disfavor toward alternative types of access
controls: user hardware filtering and Internet service provider
filtering. However, it is possible that countries will adopt still
other approaches to the problem of ―missing borders.‖ For
example, courts could continue to use a low-technology approach
to defining personal jurisdiction on the Internet,345 thereby
relieving website operators of the necessity of employing
geolocation tools to comply with the laws of different countries.
Or, instead of mandating Internet service provider filtering of
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possibly prohibited content, countries could decide to implement
detailed Internet traffic monitoring and aggressively identify and
pursue users engaging in illegal activity in cases where countries
cannot pursue website operators.
Although it is possible that the use of geolocation tools will not
be the method of choice for the territorial partitioning of
cyberspace in the future, it appears to be the preferred method at
present. Partitioning through the use of geolocation tools enjoys a
number of advantages when compared to other available
methods,346 and even if the alleged benefits of IPv6 are not fully
utilized and IPv6 does not lead to permanently assigned or
embedded IP addresses, geolocation tools can still function to
achieve the goal of cyberspace partitioning that many Internet
actors desire. However, for Internet partitioning to be truly
effective the problem of cybertravel must be addressed; cybertravel
frustrates the success of geolocation tools, making it difficult to
determine or even estimate the effectiveness of these tools.347
The legal framework in which cybertravel operates is a
patchwork of legal doctrines that were not formulated to regulate
cybertravel, or even conceived with cybertravel in mind.348
Whether the doctrines apply to cybertravel, and if so to what
extent, are questions that courts will have to address. Copyright
will probably be the area in which litigation will first arise, and the
first issues targeted will be associated with making content
available to audiences to whom the copyright holder did not intend
to extend access. These disputes will emulate cases concerning
place-shifting services that have arisen recently, such as litigation
involving ManekiTV in Japan, TV Catch UP in the United
Kingdom, and ivi and Justin.tv in the United States.349 Cybertravel
disputes will define the next generation of these cases.

346
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The extent to which cases concerning cybertravel will appear
in courts, what the outcome of such cases might be, and whether or
not any particular legal doctrines will be found to apply to
cybertravel, are questions that merit a thorough analysis. The
undeniable value in being able to view the Internet as if one were
located in another country, and the legitimate reasons why users
want or need to cybertravel warrant the consideration of options
for legal cybertravel. This article suggests that cybertravel should
be analogized to physical travel, and the benefits that society will
enjoy through cybertravel correspond in large measure to the
benefits provided by physical travel.350 Therefore, cybertravel
should enjoy constitutionally protected rights.
Of course, cybertravel is free of the natural barriers that limit
physical travel. As a result, a greater number of users can engage
in cybertravel than in physical travel, and the volume and quality
of reproduction of the content that cybertravelers can obtain will
usually be much higher than that of the content that physical
travelers may carry back to their country.351 This means that
content spillover that may be negligible in cases of physical travel
can in the case of cybertravel almost instantaneously exceed what
anyone might consider reasonable spillover.352 For example, while
the number of foreign visitors who buy a book in one country and
travel home with it may number in the thousands, the number of
foreign users cybertraveling to access a television show may be in
the millions. One problem for cybertravel is that there are no data
available to suggest the size of the cybertravel phenomenon, and it
is difficult to formulate arguments in response to those who claim
that cybertravel is a significant problem unless some data are
collected to support a claim that cybertravel, like physical travel,
leads to only negligible spillover.
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Even if it can be proven that cybertravel does not currently
pose any significant threat to right holders, website operators, and
countries‘ efforts to limit access to certain content, cybertravel
technology is rapidly changing and new simplified tools permit
more users, even ones with extremely limited technical skills, to
cybertravel. More Internet users will also be prompted to
cybertravel because of the increased use of geolocation tools by
website operators. The legal, technological, and business solutions
will need to address the practice of cybertravel and shape an
environment in which legal cybertravel—cybertravel for legitimate
purposes—will be available.
This article explores one answer to cybertravel—a system of
digital passports that would either identify specific users or provide
a minimum of information about a user‘s location, domicile, or
permanent residence. A technological solution supported by an
appropriate legal framework and enhanced by sophisticated
business solutions could solve the problem of cybertravel and
increase the opportunities that the partitioned Internet offers. This
system would need to be supported by a strict data protection
structure that would impose both legal and technical requirements
on Internet actors.
Although increased data protection
requirements may face strong resistance from some Internet actors
today, strict data protection must be integrated into the cyberspace
future.

